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INTRODUCTION 
Ten years later, the controversy and recriminations over the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property1 (TRIPs) 
have scarcely abated.  TRIPs is now firmly enshrined as part of the 
general undertaking to which all members states of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) must subscribe, supplying a new global standard 
for intellectual property protection.  Yet, commentators continue to 
differ widely as to the origins of the TRIPs Agreement, its merits and 
legitimacy, and its implications for the future of intellectual property 
rights (IPR).2 
The controversy over TRIPs extends well beyond the specifics of the 
Agreement or even intellectual property (IP) generally.  TRIPs forms 
part of a broader trend to globalize regulatory policy.3  In an era of 
shrinking borders, there is a growing demand for global solutions to 
global problems.  Yet, shifting regulatory powers from the national to 
the international level is also problematic for many reasons.  Among 
these are a familiar set of federalist concerns analogous to the domestic 
debate here in the United States.  Many question, for example, whether 
the gains from centralized policies outweigh the loss of the potential 
benefits of “state laboratories.”4  Regulatory policymaking at the 
international level raises additional issues relating to process, rather 
than outcome.  Some have argued that the “democratic deficit” inherent 
in international lawmaking calls into question the very legitimacy of 
global standards.5 
Even if one supports regulatory harmonization in principle, the 
 
1. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal 
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs 
Agreement]. 
2. See Peter Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 369 
(2006). 
3. See generally JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS 
REGULATION (2000) [hereinafter BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, BUSINESS REGULATION] 
(analyzing trend to globalization across multiple domains of business regulation). 
4. New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  
For the international version of this debate, see infra notes 59–60 and accompanying text.  
Ultimately, the “federalism” question must be answered issue by issue.  The case for 
centralization will be stronger for some issues than others. 
5. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 
114 HARV. L. REV. 511, 564 (2000) [hereinafter McGinnis & Movesian, World Trade 
Constitution]. 
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question remains whether the WTO is the right organization for the job.  
The WTO has traditionally focused on “negative integration,” i.e., 
liberalizing trade by reducing tariffs and stripping away regulatory 
barriers.  TRIPs signaled a controversial shift to a “positive integration” 
approach that goes beyond de-regulation to affirmatively re-regulate (or 
harmonize), imposing global standards in place of national ones.6  
TRIPs opponents have also challenged the WTO’s right to intrude on a 
policy area as peripheral to global trade as IP.7 
TRIPs has proven just as controversial for the manner in which the 
Agreement was reached.  In an explicit strategy of “linkage,” protection 
of IP was made a condition precedent for progress on other trade issues 
being negotiated simultaneously during GATT’s Uruguay Round.8  The 
 
6. See, e.g., Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The WTO Constitution and the Millennium 
Round, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW:  ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF 
JOHN H. JACKSON 113–19 (Marco Bronckers & Reinhard Quick eds., 2000). 
7. See, e.g., Jagdish Bhagwati, After Seattle:  Free Trade & the WTO, in EFFICIENCY, 
EQUITY, LEGITIMACY:  THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM 50, 
58 (Roger B. Porter et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter Bhagwati, After Seattle] (arguing that TRIPs 
does not belong in a trade organization because “[i]f your only criterion for getting an issue 
into the WTO is that your issue affects trade, then virtually everything gets in”).  Intellectual 
property had heretofore been dealt with in the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO), which was and is a completely separate international regime from the WTO and its 
predecessor organization, the General Agreement Trade and Tariffs (GATT).  On its face, 
the substantive connections between international trade and IPR, which have traditionally 
been governed by territorially-bounded, national law, seemed obscure and insignificant.  Nor 
did the TRIPs Agreement limit its focus to the “trade related aspects” of IP as its title 
suggests.  Not only did the regulatory harmonization imposed by TRIPs go well beyond any 
reasonable understanding of that phrase, TRIPs does not even address some of the most 
obvious points at which IPR and trade do overlap, such as the reimportation of gray market 
goods.  See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 6 (leaving exhaustion of IPR up to each 
member state to decide). 
8. See Joel P. Trachtman, Institutional Linkage:  Transcending “Trade and . . .,” 96 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 77, 79 (2002) (“TRIPS [represents] an archetypal, and advanced, case history of 
linkage.”).  The terminology of “linkage” as used in the WTO context is somewhat confused, 
because the linkage can be used both in a “substantive” sense to describe institutional or 
substantive connections between trade and non-trade issues as a matter of regulatory 
governance, as well as a “procedural” sense to describe what may be a one-time quid pro quo 
over otherwise unrelated issues in the course of negotiating a set of agreements.  Such 
“strategic linkage” can occur either unilaterally or by mutual consent.  See generally David W. 
Leebron, Symposium:  The Boundaries of the WTO:  Linkages, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 5, 11–13 
(2002) (providing a taxonomy of linkage forms).  In fact, TRIPs reflects both forms of 
linkage.  As a substantive matter, the TRIPs Agreement served to bring international IP 
protection within the ambit of world trade law, linking two issue areas that had previously 
been separate.  The achievement of TRIPs was, in turn, made possible by an exercise in 
strategic linkage in which developing nations were induced to accept upward harmonization 
of IPR in return for concessions offered in other, largely unrelated areas.  This Article focuses 
on the use of linkage strategies during trade negotiations and will, thus, use the term in its 
second (procedural) sense. 
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result was a quid pro quo in which the developed countries essentially 
pushed through IP harmonization in the face of widespread objections 
from developing nations in exchange for commitments by the former to 
open their agricultural and textile markets.9 
These controversies swirling in the wake of TRIPs are of more than 
academic or historical interest.  They have led to a sharp divide in global 
attitudes toward regulatory linkage that puts rich countries at odds with 
the developing world and has helped spawn an atmosphere of distrust 
that clouds the WTO’s broader agenda. 
This Article focuses on the process issue raised by TRIPs:  namely, 
the use of linkage strategies to advance harmonization in the WTO.  
Such “strategic linkage”—or logrolling—to negotiate tradeoffs across 
disparate issues remains highly controversial.  Logrolling is generally 
frowned upon in domestic lawmaking as it can encourage “amoral” vote 
transfers that undermine the democratic process.  Instead, rules on 
“single-issue” legislation serve to restrict package deals combining 
unrelated subject matter.10 
By contrast, linkage has proven almost endemic to multilateral trade 
negotiations—and all but unavoidable given the consensus rules under 
which the WTO operates.11  Because each nation has its own mix of 
export interests and protectionist lobbies, progress on liberalization can 
only be achieved by trading concessions between countries with 
reciprocal interests in a bilateral exchange that promises gains to both 
sides.12  The WTO combines a series of such “linked” exchanges—e.g., 
 
 9. See Yu, supra note 2 at 371–373 (describing “bargain narrative” as dominant 
explanation for TRIPs based on a North-South tradeoff of IP protection for agricultural and 
textile concessions, plus a commitment to binding dispute resolution).  The extent to which 
rich countries have, in fact, kept their side of the bargain is disputed.  See id. at 373–375 
(describing alternative “coercion” narrative, which posits a more unilateral exercise in 
strategic linkage under less equal terms).  The GATT was the WTO’s predecessor 
organization.  The Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations ran from 1986 to 1994 
and culminated in a comprehensive set of agreements of which TRIPs was one component. 
10. See infra notes 63–68 and accompanying text. 
11. Whereas the majority rules applicable in parliamentary systems allow a coalition of 
interests behind a particular policy proposal to overcome the objections of a minority, WTO 
rules permit even a single member state to block agreement.  See Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1226, 1232 (1994) 
[hereinafter WTO Charter].  Because most proposals result in identifiable winners and losers, 
the only way to stop the losers from blocking agreement is to offer a package deal with 
something in it for everyone. 
12. In this way, such countries each hope to gain enough political backing from their 
exporters who stand to gain from liberalization in one sector to overcome opposition from 
the protectionists who stand to lose in another sector.  By necessity, the gain/losses must be 
reciprocal in nature for each country to come out ahead in this calculus.  See McGinnis & 
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tariff reductions on steel in return for cuts in tobacco subsidies—in a 
global package deal negotiated over the course of a multi-year “round” 
of trade negotiations.  Thus, multilateral trade negotiations are 
explicitly structured around multi-sectoral linkages. 
The use of trade policy as a lever to achieve progress on non-trade 
issues has a lengthy, albeit controversial pedigree.13  Trade sanctions 
continue to be a widely employed tool in international relations.14  What 
was novel about TRIPs, however, was the use of trade linkages to create 
new international law rather than enforce existing obligations:15  the new 
law, in this case, being an agreement to harmonize intellectual property 
rights within the WTO itself.16 
Regulatory harmonization of such non-trade issues differs 
significantly from the trade liberalization that has been the WTO’s 
traditional focus.  For one thing, regulatory standards can serve as a 
vehicle for covert protectionism—the antithesis of liberalization.  
Because of such differences, this Article will argue that the shift from 
negative to positive integration in the WTO presents special risks that 
justify procedural safeguards.  While package deals remain essential to 
the WTO’s mission of trade liberalization, special rules should apply 
when regulatory policymaking is concerned. 
Much of the harmonization debate in the WTO has focused on the 
extent to which non-trade issues belong in the WTO and where to draw 
the outer limits of its jurisdiction.17  Comparatively less attention has 
 
Movesian, World Trade Constitution, supra note 5, at 545–46. 
13. During the Cold War, for example, the U.S. Congress linked trade privileges for 
the Soviet Union to its policies on Jewish emigration.  The Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the 
1974 Trade Act formalized this practice by requiring the President to certify that the Soviet 
Union had made progress on liberalizing Jewish emigration in order to be eligible for “most-
favored nation” (MFN) status as a trade partner.  Until recently, a similar requirement 
conditioned China’s MFN privileges on its human rights record.  The ritual of annual MFN 
certifications of China only ended in 2001 with China’s admission to the WTO.  See HENRY J. 
STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT:  LAW, 
POLITICS, MORALS 1109–1115 (2d ed. 2000). 
14. Cf. Converting Damascus, ECONOMIST, Oct. 29, 2005, at 14 (describing the recent 
use of trade sanctions against Libya and threatened sanctions against Syria). 
15. By contrast, the various boycotts and embargoes enforced by the United States and 
its allies against “rogue nations” generally have a stated objective of forcing nations to 
comply with existing international commitments or punishing them to the extent they have 
not. 
16. See BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, BUSINESS REGULATION, supra note 3, at 221 
(“TRIPS is the only case of ‘positive’ linkage of non-trade regulatory standards to the GATT. 
. . .”). 
17. See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, Triangulating the WTO, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 28–30 (2002); 
Trachtman, supra note 8, at 77–78. 
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been devoted to the process by which agreement on non-trade issues is 
reached.  However, this Article argues that process matters.  It will 
propose specific rules to regulate the use of linkage strategies to 
advance regulatory harmonization of non-trade issues. 
The argument will proceed in five parts.  Part I situates the “linkage” 
issue within the larger “constitutional” debate surrounding the WTO.  
Part II examines a prominent, recent proposal to institutionalize 
strategic linkage as the lynchpin of an expanded WTO.  After 
considering the proposal’s potential to overcome distributional skews 
that block single-issue negotiations, this Article assesses the proposal’s 
possible pitfalls and unintended effects.  In particular, it argues that 
linkage may encourage tactical abuses, create logistical obstacles, give 
rise to regulatory protectionism, and undermine the WTO’s legitimacy.  
Part III then analyzes the TRIPs Agreement as a case study to evaluate 
these risks.  It concludes that some degree of regulatory linkage may be 
a necessarily evil, but only if the downsides can be minimized.  The risks 
of linkage, both specific and systemic, may thus justify some form of 
formal controls.  Part IV next considers substantive approaches to 
control strategic linkage, ranging from a total ban to a limiting criterion 
of “mutual gain.”  Rather than searching for substantive criteria to 
evaluate linkage proposals, however, this Article argues in Part V that 
the better approach is to rely on procedural mechanisms to accomplish 
this screening.  Regulatory proposals would need to demonstrate 
support among a significant subset of WTO Members to “pre-qualify” 
for inclusion in a trade round.  Ensuring such “pre-commitment” on the 
part of WTO Members would improve both the quality and legitimacy 
of regulatory agreements negotiated under future trade rounds.  It 
would also promote greater confidence in the multilateral system.   
I.  TRIPS, REGULATORY LINKAGE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE 
WTO 
TRIPs was born as part of the “big bang” in world trade law 
emerging from the Uruguay Round, which witnessed the creation of the 
WTO itself and an ambitious expansion of the GATT treaty system.18  
 
18. The Uruguay Round was part of a succession of periodic “trade rounds” conducted 
under the auspices of the GATT system in which multilateral negotiators meeting over a 
course of years arrived at global package deals on tariff reductions and trade regulation.  In 
addition to the agreements on the WTO and TRIPs, the Uruguay Round culminated in 
several other landmark agreements, including, inter alia, the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS), which expanded GATT principles for the first time to the service sector, 
and the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), a similar (more 
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In the wake of these historic achievements, commentators have argued 
over the extent to which global trade law has reached a “constitutional 
moment.”19  After Uruguay, many saw the WTO as poised to make the 
same leap as the European Community made from a multilateral treaty 
organization to a more organically integrated organ of supranational 
governance.20  Although such euphoric visions faded in the dramatic 
failure of the Seattle Ministerial Conference four years later,21 the 
“constitutional” questions remained as WTO Members and 
commentators engaged in a collective soul searching over the WTO’s 
purpose and future.22 
In undertaking a sweeping harmonization of an issue at best only 
tangentially related to trade, TRIPs both expanded the WTO’s 
jurisdictional reach and signaled a dramatic turn towards positive 
integration.23  As commentators debate the feasibility and desirability of 
 
tentative) agreement on foreign investment, an agreement to phase out textile quotas, and 
major new disciplines governing subsidies, anti-dumping duties, safeguard measures, health 
and safety standards, and technical barriers.  All of which formed part of the single 
undertaking to which all WTO Members were obliged to subscribe.  Two additional 
agreements on government procurement and aviation were concluded on a plurilateral basis. 
19. See Peter Holmes, The WTO and the EU:  Some Constitutional Comparisons, in 
THE EU AND THE WTO:  LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 59, 76 (Gráinne de Búrca & 
Joanne Scott eds., 2001); Neil Walker, Constitutionalism in a New Key, in the WTO and the 
EU:  Some Constitutional Comparisons, in THE EU AND THE WTO:  LEGAL AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES, supra, at 31. 
20. See, e.g., Petersmann, supra note 6, at 118 (arguing that WTO harmonization 
“requires, as in European integration law, a progressive ‘constitutionalization’ of GATT and 
WTO law”).  See generally THE EU AND THE WTO:  LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES, 
supra note 19 (comparing WTO and EU regimes). 
21. See Thomas Cottier, Limits to International Trade:  The Constitutional Challenge, 
94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 220, 220 (2000). 
22. See id. at 221. 
23. See Bhagwati, After Seattle, supra note 7, at 58; Daniel Kalderimis, Problems of 
WTO Harmonization and the Virtues of Shields Over Swords, 13 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 
304, 329 (2004); see also Petersmann, supra note 6, at 114 (noting the further anomaly that 
unlike prior trade agreements that have focused on public law, TRIPs mandates the 
enforcement of private rights in a purely domestic context).  But see KEITH E. MASKUS, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 239 (2000) (arguing that IP 
is sufficiently trade-related to justify inclusion in the WTO); John O. McGinnis & Mark L. 
Movsesian, Against Global Governance in the WTO, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 353 (2004) 
[hereinafter McGinnis & Movsesian, Against Global Governance].  In contrast to TRIPs’ 
unabashedly comprehensive and intrusive scope, the WTO’s other ventures into regulatory 
harmonization have, by comparison, been more circumspect.  The regulatory authority 
asserted in the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) 
and Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) is largely indirect, serving as a 
defensive measure to insulate trade from regulatory protectionism, while the TRIMs 
Agreement is largely declaratory of pre-existing principles.  See Kalderimis, supra note 23, at 
329–31 (distinguishing between “defensive” and “progressive” harmonization); id. at 333 
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incorporating a broader range of policy concerns into the legal and 
institutional machinery of the WTO, TRIPs naturally plays a pivotal 
role in this debate.24  Some see the TRIPs Agreement as one of the 
WTO’s chief accomplishments25 and a major innovation in international 
trade law.26  Even those who disagree with TRIPs often see it as a 
template for regulatory policymaking by the WTO on issues they do 
support.27  Others see the Agreement as, at best, an unfortunate detour28 
or cautionary tale,29 and, at worst, the embodiment of all that is wrong 
with the WTO.30  As noted, these differences in opinion are more than 
 
(regarding TRIMs). 
24. See Charnovitz, supra note 17 (providing analytic framework to evaluate claims for 
regulatory linkage). 
25. See, e.g., EDMOND MCGONUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION §§ 21.211, 
21.21-1 (1995) (“The conclusion of the . . . TRIPS Agreement was perhaps the most 
remarkable achievement of the Uruguay Round.”). 
26. See, e.g., MASKUS, supra note 23, at 2 (describing the TRIPs Agreement’s 
importance as “the first multilateral trade accord that aims at achieving partial harmonization 
in an extensive area of business regulation [that] forms the vanguard of efforts to establish 
deep integration of domestic regulatory policies among countries”). 
27. Charnovitz, supra note 17, at 29; Kalderimis, supra note 23, at 342; see also 
Frederick M. Abbott, Distributed Governance at the WTO-WIPO, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW:  ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JOHN H. JACKSON, supra note 6, 
at 25–33 [hereinafter Abbott, Distributed Governance] (exploring the division of labor 
between TRIPs and WIPO as a model for further regulatory expansion by the WTO); 
Andrew Guzman, Global Governance and the WTO, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 303 (2004) (citing 
TRIPs as an example of the benefits of linkage). 
28. See, e.g., Holmes, supra note 19, at 76; Kalderimis, supra note 23, at 305, 346 
(calling for a moratorium on further regulatory harmonization by the WTO). 
29. See, e.g., Kalderimis, supra note 22, at 342–43 (pointing to conflict over AIDS 
pharmaceutical patents as an example of the unbalanced weighting of priorities arising from 
forced regulatory harmonization); Petersmann, supra note 6, at 122 (citing the one-sided 
regulatory balance struck under TRIPs as an example of distorted policymaking likely to be 
enacted under current WTO procedures). 
30. See, e.g., Bhagwati, After Seattle, supra note 7, at 59 (describing TRIPs as an 
unwanted “third limb” that will impede progress on trade liberalization); Francis Mangeni, 
Implementing the TRIPS Agreement in Africa, in TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE:  DEVELOPMENT 
PERSPECTIVES ON TRIPS, TRADE AND SUSTAINABILITY 219, 230 (Christophe Bellman et al. 
eds., 2003) (describing TRIPs as “in essence written by developed country industry lobbies” 
at the risk of “[i]mpoverishing and leaving destitute entire populations in developing 
countries”).  The disastrous campaign recently waged by U.S. pharmaceutical companies to 
enforce patent rights over AIDS medication has only intensified perceptions of TRIPs as the 
ugly face of trade-driven globalization.  See, e.g., K. Balasubramaniam, Access to Medicines 
and Public Policy Safeguards Under TRIPS, in TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE:  DEVELOPMENT 
PERSPECTIVES ON TRIPS, TRADE AND SUSTAINABILITY, supra, at 135.  Pharmaceutical 
patents are not the only aspect of intellectual property protection that have attracted the ire 
of globalization opponents.  Trademark and copyright enforcement, also expanded by TRIPs, 
are viewed as paving the way for the “Coca-Cola-ization” and “Disneysification” of the 
planet.  See generally Rosemary J. Coombe, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL 
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academic.  The unresolved North-South split over TRIPs and its legacy 
hangs over the WTO as a focus of discord and distrust. 
These contrasting perspectives on TRIPs to some extent reflect 
different normative conceptions of the WTO.  Commentators who see 
the WTO as following the evolution of the European Community from 
common market to political union welcome a positive integration 
agenda as part of a deepening commitment to world governance.31  
Some have openly called for the WTO to embrace its de facto role as 
global regulator.32  Other commentators regard regulatory 
harmonization as inherently suspect and have counseled the WTO to 
stick to its core mission of trade liberalization.33 
Such opposing viewpoints can, in turn, be traced to differing 
conceptions of linkage.  For some, package deal-making in the WTO is a 
win-win proposition that makes it a natural choice as an organ of world 
governance.34  Others see the potential abuses of logrolling as an 
argument against regulatory harmonization.35 
This Article critically examines such contrasting views on linkage, 
using TRIPs as a case study.  It finds merit on both sides of the 
argument, viewing strategic linkage as a double-edged sword.  Linkage 
provides a powerful tool to negotiate reciprocal concessions across 
unrelated policy areas.  However, unrestricted use of linkage can lead to 
sub-optimal outcomes—with TRIPs arguably serving as a case in point.  
Ultimately, using package deals to enact regulatory standards on non-
trade issues may sometimes prove a necessary evil.  However, the 
procedurally suspect nature of such deals demands special rules to 
regulate them. 
In some respects, the specific procedural proposal advanced here 
parallels efforts by other commentators to address the “democracy 
 
PROPERTIES:  AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW, 52–55 (1998) (describing how 
IPR facilitate the domination of global culture by a handful of multinational conglomerates); 
Naomi Klein, NO LOGO:  TAKING AIM AT THE BRAND BULLIES (2001) (criticizing the global 
branding phenomenon as perpetuating an oppressive and exploitative corporate hegemony). 
31. See, e.g., Holmes, supra note 19; Joanne Scott, International Trade and 
Environmental Governance:  Relating Rules (and Standards) in the EU and the WTO, 15 EUR. 
J. INT’L L. 307, 308–12 (2004); Walker, supra note 19.  But see Kalderimis, supra note 23, at 
341–43 (arguing that the WTO lacks the democratic legitimacy to emulate the European 
Union). 
32. Guzman, supra note 27, at 307–08; Marco Bronckers, More Power to the WTO, 4 J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 41, 45 nn.15–20 (2001) (somewhat more tentatively). 
33. McGinnis & Movesian, World Trade Constitution, supra note 5, at 552–66. 
34. Bronckers, supra note 32, at 45 nn.15–16; Guzman, supra note 27, at 316–21. 
35. See McGinnis & Movsesian, Against Global Governance, supra note 23, at 355. 
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deficit” inherent in the WTO’s exercise of regulatory authority.  
However, their solutions have generally involved “constitutionalizing” 
the WTO in ways that would fundamentally alter the nature of the 
organization:  either by entrenching binding norms such as a respect for 
fundamental rights, creating new mechanisms for participation by civil 
society and/or national parliamentarians, or even moving to some form 
of direct electoral representation.36  The proposal that this Article 
makes, however, entails a more modest, sub-constitutional solution, 
analogous to the parliamentary rules that govern domestic lawmaking.  
It would merely require harmonization proposals to undergo a “pre-
qualifying” procedure before they could be linked into multilateral 
trade negotiations.  To prepare the ground for this proposal, it is first 
necessary to consider more carefully the pros and cons of linkage. 
II.  DOUBLE OR NOTHING:  THE UNCERTAIN PROMISE OF STRATEGIC 
LINKAGE 
One of the strongest endorsements of linkage in the WTO appears 
in Andrew Guzman’s recent article entitled Global Governance and the 
WTO.37  Guzman envisions an expanded, restructured WTO that would 
serve as a forum in which international negotiators could address trade 
and non-trade issue alike.38  One of Guzman’s main arguments for 
centralizing such negotiations within a single umbrella organization is 
that it would facilitate strategic linkage that would make possible a 
broader range of international agreements than if such negotiations 
remained compartmentalized in separate single-issue forums.  Guzman 
sees linkage as enabling creative tradeoffs to the mutual benefit of the 
international community.  Guzman is hardly the first to contemplate 
such benefits.39  However, his article proposes an innovative institutional 
 
36. See, e.g., Petersmann, supra note 6, at 122–25; Peter Van den Bossche & Iveta 
Alexovicova, Effective Global Economic Governance by the World Trade Organization, 8 J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 667, 672–683 (2005).  See generally THE EU AND THE WTO:  LEGAL AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES, supra note 19 (considering the potential for the WTO to evolve 
into a supranational regime akin to the EU and addressing concerns over democracy deficits 
in both contexts). 
37. Guzman, supra note 27. 
38. Guzman envisions issue areas being divided into separate departments within the 
expanded WTO, with single-issue agreements being negotiated at the department level.  Id. 
at 307–08.  The real innovation of Guzman’s plan, however, concerns his proposed “Mega-
Rounds,” in which free-wheeling negotiations would encourage concessions across issue 
areas.  Id. at 308. 
39. See Charnovitz, supra note 17, at 31 (quoting WTO Director-General Mike Moore 
as urging “governments to ‘broaden the negotiating agenda’” to enable cross-issue 
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mechanism to facilitate cross-issue linkages. 
Guzman’s vision for the WTO is by no means confined to strategic 
linkage.  His proposal calls for a “World Economic Organization” that 
would permanently entrench an expanded range of issues under the 
WTO’s authority.  Guzman justifies this ambitious proposal by arguing 
that ongoing conflicts between trade and non-trade issues can only be 
resolved by bringing all such concerns within the jurisdiction of a single 
international regime that can address them on an equal footing.  Such 
consolidation would facilitate an integrated approach to regulatory 
policymaking that could craft comprehensive global solutions to 
complex global problems.40  Much of his article describes the 
institutional restructuring necessary to achieve the expanded, revamped 
WTO he envisions. 
Guzman presents a well thought-out, forward-looking essay that 
provides much food for discussion.  This Article addresses only the 
linkage aspects of Guzman’s proposal.  It argues that the case for 
encouraging strategic linkage as a means to advance regulatory 
harmonization is more qualified than Guzman suggests.  First, there 
may be less need for cross-issue tradeoffs than Guzman assumes.  
Second, in addition to opening the door to otherwise unattainable 
outcomes, strategic linkage may also result in blocking equally desirable 
agreements.  Third, the benefits afforded by such negotiated tradeoffs 
may be outweighed by potential negatives.  Indeed, the potential for 
sub-optimal41 outcomes to arise from linkage strategies justifies formal 
limitations on their use.  A future “World Economic Organization” of 
the type Guzman envisions would be wise to adopt procedural 
safeguards to restrict such practices. 
Guzman’s case for strategic linkage hinges on his observation that 
negotiations within the framework of a single-issue regime sometimes 
flounder over skewed distributional outcomes:  i.e., when a proposed 
agreement disproportionately burdens certain nations and benefits 
others.  Particularly when unanimity is required (or virtual unanimity as 
 
concessions that will increase the chance of a successful trade agreement). 
40. Guzman, supra note 27, at 305–07. 
41. This Article will refer to such concepts as “optimality,” “global welfare,” 
“desirability,” “aggregate benefit,” etc., more or less synonymously to describe favorable 
policy outcomes from the standpoint of the international community as a whole, judged in the 
broadest possible sense.  It does not propose specific definitions or yardsticks to assess them 
(nor does Guzman).  The argument that follows is therefore contingent on the assumption 
that the range of available definitions for these concepts will yield an area of overlap on 
which most people could agree. 
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in the WTO), important policy initiatives may, thus, remain stymied, 
even if the world as a whole would undeniably benefit from action.42  
Guzman suggests that linkage can overcome such obstacles by 
“compensating” those nations that are disadvantaged by a policy 
initiative in one area with offsetting concessions in unrelated areas.43 
Guzman offers TRIPs as a successful example of tradeoffs that 
resulted in mutual benefit.  He observes that proposals for a treaty 
enforcing mandatory IPR languished for years in the WIPO in the face 
of opposition from developing nations that, as net IP importers, would 
bear the costs of increased IP protection.44  By offering such nations 
concessions in other trade sectors, Guzman sees linkage as having 
facilitated a win-win solution.45 
Leaving aside the question of whether TRIPs really was a “win-win” 
outcome, as a descriptive matter, Guzman’s account of the potential for 
linkage to overcome distributional skews seems correct.  Whether the 
experience of TRIPs can be generalized to justify an endorsement of 
cross-issue linkages to advance other regulatory goals remains to be 
seen.  First of all, it is worth noting that linkage across issue areas is not 
the only way of overcoming skewed distributional outcomes.  Creative 
tradeoffs and burden-sharing mechanisms can sometimes be devised 
within a given policy domain.  The carbon trading regime established 
under the Kyoto Agreement on Global Warming offers one such 
example, providing a market-driven mechanism to share the burdens of 
preventing global warming.46  Similar solutions may be available in many 
 
42. Guzman gives the example of an agreement to prevent deforestation that would 
benefit the international community by slowing global warming and preserving biodiversity, 
but would put a disproportionate burden of securing such benefits on Brazil.  Guzman, supra 
note 27, at 318.  Even if the agreement was in Brazil’s long-term interest, it might prove 
politically untenable for Brazil to accept all the pain for a shared global gain. 
43. Id.  In Guzman’s deforestation example, Brazil would receive trade concessions in 
some of its export markets to act as the sweetener that would cinch the environmental deal.  
See Leebron, supra note 8, at 26 (noting that linkage “offers the potential to expand the 
means by which mutuality can be achieved, and thus enhances the ability to reach an 
agreement”). 
44. See Guzman, supra note 27, at 317; see also Meir P. Pugatch, The International 
Regulation of IPRs in a TRIPS and TRIPS-plus World, 6 J. WORLD INVEST. & TRADE 431, 
435 (2005) (providing empirical data confirming that the distribution of patents rights 
overwhelmingly favors developed nations).  Mandatory enforcement of IPR can be expected 
to result in increased monopoly rents paid by developing nations to IPR holders located 
primarily in rich countries.  Although TRIPs advocates dangled the prospect of increased 
foreign investment as a compensating factor, almost no one seriously expected such promises 
to fully offset the costs. 
45. Guzman, supra note 27, at 316–17. 
46. Carbon trading provides an incentive for richer countries to “buy” carbon emission 
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other policy areas.47 
It is true that there would remain desirable policy outcomes for 
which the scope for burden-sharing mechanisms is structurally 
constrained.  The harmonization of intellectual property protection may 
have been one such example.48  However, even if linkage could provide 
a way out in such cases, it is far from clear that the potential gains 
outweigh the risks.  There is no guarantee that linkage would be 
restricted to the limited set of cases in which a desirable policy is 
blocked by distributional skews.  While the benefits would primarily be 
captured in those cases, the negative consequences of encouraging 
linkage could prove to be systemic. 
While opening the door to cross-issue concessions increases the 
range of possible tradeoffs and, thus, expands the set of outcomes 
theoretically available, it does not follow, however, that more 
agreements would necessarily result.  Linkage claims could 
inadvertently disrupt progress in sectors in which agreement was 
 
credits by investing in cost-effective emission reduction in less efficient and dirtier industries 
in the developing world.  This burden-sharing mechanism enables rich countries to subsidize 
emission control technologies in rapidly industrializing nations in the developing world that 
would pose a prohibitive cost to the latter on their own.  See Jagdish Bhagwati, Afterword:  
The Question of Linkage, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 126, 134 (2002) [hereinafter Bhagwati, 
Symposium]. 
47. See id. (describing a similar burden-sharing solution to protect turtles whereby rich 
countries would purchase turtle excluder devices for use by shrimp fishermen from 
developing nations); Leebron, supra note 8, at 14 (providing further examples of single-issue 
offsets and burden-sharing). 
48. The nature of IPR as private forms of quasi-property make burden-sharing 
mechanisms vastly more difficult, while the distributional skews associated with such rights 
are more extreme than with carbon emission controls.  It is not entirely inconceivable to 
envision an alternative to TRIPs that might have been devised so as to overcome the 
misgivings of the developing world without extrinsic offsets.  Some forms of IPR would 
arguably benefit developing nations.  For example, recognizing IPR in traditional knowledge 
would favor developing nations.  Conditioning IPR on reciprocal transfers of technology 
could offset the burden of paying monopoly rents.  Even within the current structure of 
TRIPs, commentators have pointed out a number of modifications, ranging from fees 
concessions on patent applications to increased technical assistance and burden sharing on 
enforcement costs, which could result in a more equitable agreement.  See Carlos Correa, 
Formulating Effective Pro-Development National Intellectual Property Policies, in TRADING 
IN KNOWLEDGE:  DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES ON TRIPS, TRADE AND SUSTAINABILITY, 
supra note 30, at 209, 210; J.H. Reichman, The TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age:  Conflict or 
Cooperation with the Developing Countries?, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 441, 452, 465–68 
(2000).  Nonetheless, the experience in WIPO illustrates the daunting task of forging such a 
consensus.  One could also argue that any compromise solution would require the underlying 
rights to be diluted to such an extent that the benefits of TRIPs would themselves be 
compromised. 
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otherwise feasible.49  The breakdowns at the recent Cancún and Seattle 
ministerials may provide examples of such disruptive effects that should 
be balanced against the successful linkage practiced during the Uruguay 
Round.  In Seattle, attempts to force human rights and labor law onto 
the trade agenda provoked a revolt by developing countries.50  In 
Cancún, the so-called “Singapore” issues—among them competition 
(antitrust), foreign investment, and government procurement—played a 
central role in the collapse of negotiations.51 
Facilitating linkage might also encourage certain actors to engage in 
opportunistic forms of strategic behavior.  For example, a country might 
engage in a “holdout” strategy, blocking an agreement on issues to 
which it has no intrinsic objection in order to gain negotiating leverage 
elsewhere.52  Linkage claims could also provide a convenient device to 
sabotage progress on other issues without the need to oppose them 
openly.53  The European Union has been accused of playing such a game 
in the current Doha Round to avoid making good on its promises of 
agricultural concessions.54  Widespread abuse of such tactics might result 
in fewer agreements rather than more. 
Even without such bad faith intent, the logistical complexities of 
multi-directional negotiations across an increased set of issues in the 
largely unregulated “bazaar” that GATT/WTO rounds foster could 
potentially be staggering.  Without controls on who could link what to 
where and when, paralysis might ensue, as Guzman himself 
acknowledges.55 
 
49. Leebron, supra note 8, at 25. 
50. See Bhagwati, Symposium, supra note 46, at 128 (ascribing failure of Seattle talks to 
linkage). 
51. See The WTO Under Fire:  Why Did the World Trade Talks in Mexico Fall Apart?  
And Who Is to Blame?, ECONOMIST, Sept. 20, 2003, at 26–28 [hereinafter WTO Under Fire].  
As in Seattle, the split over the Singapore issues at Cancún was largely along North-South 
lines.  See id. 
52. Charnovitz, supra note 17, at 31 n.18 (quoting Kenneth W. Abbott, Rule-Making in 
the WTO:  Lessons from the Case of Bribery and Corruption, 4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 275, 293 
(2001)); Leebron, supra note 8, at 25. 
53. The WTO’s consensus rules otherwise require blocking nations to voice active 
opposition to a proposal, a stance that in some cases they might be reluctant to take for any 
number of reasons, such as a need to honor previous commitments (or at least be seen to), 
appeasement of domestic lobbies, or a perceived vulnerability on other issues. 
54. See Robert D. Hormats, Governance of the Global Trading System, in EFFICIENCY, 
EQUITY, LEGITIMACY:  THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM, 
supra note 7, at 392, 399 (describing suspicion “that the EU has ulterior motives in wanting a 
broader round with several controversial items on the agenda”). 
55. See Guzman, supra note 27, at 310 (“An increase in the number of topics within the 
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Guzman seeks to avert this danger primarily by calling for single-
issue negotiations within a specialized departmental structure.56  
Negotiations carried out during periodic “Departmental Rounds” would 
be confined to the specific subject-matter of each department.  Guzman 
argues that such “Departmental Rounds” would take the pressure off 
separately conducted, multi-issue “Mega Rounds” by eliminating the 
need to address every issue within an “all-at-once” negotiating 
structure. 
If the division of labor between “Departmental” and “Mega 
Rounds” could be optimized, this dual format structure could 
potentially offer the best of both worlds.  Agreements conducive to 
single-issue resolution could be addressed departmentally, while “Mega 
Rounds” would be reserved for impasses that defied single-issue 
solutions.57  However, Guzman’s proposal fails to provide any 
channeling mechanism to guide negotiations to the appropriate level 
and, thus, offers no assurances that the right allocations would be made. 
In particular, Guzman’s assumption that “many valuable 
agreements” would be achieved departmentally seems misplaced.  He 
justifies this assumption on historical grounds, noting that “virtually all 
international negotiations on regulatory matters undertaken to date . . . 
have addressed only a single issue area.”58  Yet, historically, 
international negotiators have not had recourse to a multi-issue forum 
that enables cost-free recourse to linkage strategy.  For most of the post-
war period, single-issue regimes operated within discrete, well-defined 
 
WTO’s jurisdiction increases the set of potential deals, the number of negotiators, and the 
number of relevant interests at stake.  At best, attempting to conduct all negotiations 
simultaneously would be inefficient.  At worst, it might be paralyzing.”).  Guzman’s fatalistic 
conclusion that “[c]omplexity is the inevitable result of trying to tackle the difficult problem 
of how to balance competing interests at a global level” offers little reassurance or 
consolation.  Id. at 312. 
56. Guzman also makes the following prediction: 
WTO members would limit the range of issues to be discussed in the same way they 
do with WTO negotiating rounds today, i.e. they would have preliminary discussions 
to set out a work program for negotiations.  Though the work program may be 
changed as the negotiations proceed, as happened during the Uruguay Round 
negotiations, it helps member to focus on a common set of questions. 
Guzman, supra note 27, at 308 n.30 (citation omitted).  The assumption that not every 
possible issue would enter the ring on any given round may be correct.  However, this says 
very little about how Members would decide which issues get nominated for discussion.  As 
Guzman notes, existing WTO practice is rather variable on this score. 
57. Cf. Leebron, supra note 8, at 27 (noting that “[i]n most situations, linkage is a 
second-best solution”). 
58. See Guzman, supra note 27, at 310. 
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boundaries with few institutional mechanisms for cross-regime 
interchange.59  The availability of Guzman’s “Mega Rounds” would 
dramatically lower the transaction costs for nations to engage in 
strategic linkage both by facilitating the logistics and legitimizing the 
practice.  The temptation to use linkage strategies to barter around 
roadblocks could undercut the commitment of departmental negotiators 
to pursue the hard compromises and creative maneuvering necessary to 
reach a single-issue solution while increasing the temptation to engage 
in opportunistic “holdout” tactics aimed at leveraging concessions 
elsewhere.  Over time, more and more policy matters would become 
dependent on multi-issue resolutions. 
Furthermore, even if linkage could facilitate the resolution of 
difficult issues, it also does not follow that the agreements through 
linkage achieved would necessarily be desirable ones.  In many cases, 
skewed distributional outcomes may be a sign that the world as whole 
would not be better off with the proposed initiative, despite the 
preferences of some subset of its member states.  An agreement to 
harmonize labor regulations at rich country standards with high 
minimum wages and restrictions on working hours might be one 
example.  Such an agreement would force developing nations to forfeit 
an important comparative advantage in the world marketplace and 
could result in a net loss in aggregate welfare.  Similar criticisms have 
been lodged at the upward harmonization of IPR mandated by TRIPs, 
which some see as impeding rather than promoting global innovation.60 
Indeed, the case for the regulatory harmonization is rarely 
unequivocal even without distributional imbalances.61  There is no 
reason to believe that nations would confine their harmonization efforts 
to the most “deserving” cases, even assuming one could tell which is 
 
59. Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Club Model of Multilateral 
Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, LEGITIMACY:  
THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM, supra note 7, at 264, 266. 
60. See infra notes 120–141 and accompanying text. 
61. International harmonization may reduce transaction costs to global traders.  
Petersmann, supra note 6, at 119.  However, it has to be balanced against the costs.  See id.  
Some issues may be better left regulated at the national or local level for several reasons:  to 
better address local contexts or to respond to changing conditions.  There is also a case for 
encouraging experimentation and regulatory competition across national regimes.  See 
Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, “Subsidiarity” in the WTO Context from a Legal Perspective, in NEW 
DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW:  ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JOHN H. 
JACKSON, supra note 6, at 36 (exploring subsidiarity in the European Union as a model of 
regulatory federalism for WTO); McGinnis & Movesian, World Trade Constitution, supra 
note 5, at 552–62. 
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which.  Indeed, countries benefiting from the skewed outcomes would 
have a built-in incentive to push regulatory harmonization regardless of 
global welfare.  That such negotiations would take place in an 
organization dominated by trade concerns would have its own 
disruptive effects.62  Nations would be tempted to subvert negotiations 
over regulatory policy to serve mercantilist ends, exacerbating rather 
than ameliorating the distributional skews of regulatory outcomes.63  
Unrestricted use of trade linkage could provide them the leverage to 
impose harmonization measures under all sorts of sub-optimal 
conditions. 
Even if regulatory efforts were confined to policy areas in which a 
strong theoretical case for harmonization exists, there is still a risk that 
the sort of package deals that Guzman contemplates could yield 
undesirable outcomes due to “regulatory capture” by special interests.  
It is no accident that virtually all parliamentary systems have rules 
against vote trading as well as restrictions on the scope of legislative 
acts.64  “Germaneness” requirements or “single-subject” rules serve to 
improve clarity and accountability by forcing legislators to vote on a 
coherent set of proposals focused on addressing an identifiable issue.  
Restricting legislation to a single issue also makes it easier to weigh 
costs against benefits on an apples-to-apples basis, improving the quality 
of deliberation.65  In the absence of such safeguards, special interests can 
more easily manipulate legislation to serve their private interests.66  Such 
 
62. To be fair, Guzman recognizes the need to re-balance the WTO to ensure that 
trade concerns no longer dominate.  Guzman, supra note 27, at 332–33.  However, it is not 
clear that there is an easy remedy.  By its very nature, trade intersects with an enormous 
variety of issues, and the reality is that trade lobbies tend to speak with a louder voice than 
other constituents.  Combining issue regimes under a single roof would make it easier for 
trade functionaries to monitor and meddle in negotiations carried out in other policy sectors. 
63. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Asserting Copyright’s Democratic Principles in the 
Global Arena, 51 VAND. L. REV. 217, 219–20 (1998) (describing policy distortion arising from 
reconceptualization of IP as a trade issue). 
64. See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 82 (1989); Millard H. Ruud, No Law 
Shall Embrace More Than One Subject, 42 MINN. L. REV. 389–90 (1958) (tracing such scope 
limitations date back to ancient Rome). 
65. The formal basis of such rules varies.   In some systems, the rules remain implicit 
within parliamentary custom.  Several states in the United States, however, require “single-
issue” legislation as a constitutional requirement.  See generally Ruud, supra note 64 
(surveying state provisions). 
66. This can occur several ways.  An existing piece of legislation can be “hijacked” by 
some unrelated provision in which its objectionable nature is either hidden or simply not 
worth fighting over.  Custom-built coalitions can be manufactured through manipulations of 
agenda.  And “poison pills” can be inserted to torpedo measures that would otherwise attract 
widespread support.  See, e.g., Madison Nat’l Bank v. Newrath, 275 A.2d 495 (Md. 1971) 
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rules also serve to restrict the scope for linkage—or “logrolling” as it is 
often called in legislative contexts—by preventing package deals that 
lock in reciprocal bargains.67  Logrolling is generally regarded as 
contrary to democratic principles because it encourages “amoral vote 
transfers” by legislators who no longer base their decisions on the merits 
of individual bills.68 
The assumption that such restrictions lead to better legislation is 
arguably demonstrated in the legislative habits of the U.S. Congress.  
Large omnibus legislation and/or budgetary authorizations serve as 
perennial magnets for “pork,” because they involve package deals in 
which “riders” advancing private interests can easily evade scrutiny or at 
least logroll their way past opposition.69  Such pork-barrel politics is 
harder to practice when individual bills are confined to relatively narrow 
issues. 
Domestic legislatures also incorporate a number of other procedural 
safeguards designed to improve the deliberative process, prevent last 
minute surprises, and guard against capture by special interests.70  
Committee systems, bicameralism, executive vetoes, multiple reading 
requirements, limits on floor amendments—all of these checks and 
balances serve to slow down the legislative process and provide more 
points of entry for democratic inputs.71  The absence of such procedural 
protections at the international level should make logrolling even more 
suspect when used to negotiate treaties. 
 
(discussing dangers of mixed-purpose legislation). 
67. It is impossible to eliminate logrolling entirely as such deals can still be made 
informally.  However, by forcing separate votes on individual bills, legislators become 
accountable for their choices on an issue-specific basis, making naked vote trading a more 
costly proposition.  Moreover, preventing package deals makes logrolls more uncertain by 
raising the possibility of defections during the course of sequential voting, as well as the 
chance that the separate bills might not pass on their own.  See MUELLER, supra note 64, at 
82, 85; Ruud, supra note 64, at 391. 
68. McGinnis & Movesian, Against Global Governance, supra note 23, at 355; see 
JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT:  LOGICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 123 (1999) (“With relatively few 
exceptions logrolling phenomena have been viewed as deviations from the orderly working of 
the democratic process.”). 
69. See MUELLER, supra note 64, at 84; WILLIAM D. POPKIN, MATERIALS ON 
LEGISLATION:  POLITICAL LANGUAGE AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS 127–30 (4th ed. 2005).  
The energy and transportation bills recently enacted by the current Congress offer especially 
grotesque examples of such perversion of public legislation. 
70. State legislatures tend to have the strongest procedural safeguards, reflecting the 
tradition of part-time citizen legislators who had only limited time to devote to monitoring 
legislation and were prone to capture by special interests.  Id. at 1014–15. 
71. Id. at 130, 1014–15, 1029. 
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Moreover, the democratic shortcomings of international lawmaking 
raise added dangers.  As John McGinnis and Mark Movsesian have 
observed, the political economy of international regulation makes it 
especially vulnerable to sub-optimal outcomes.72  “Interest groups have 
substantially more power at the global than at the domestic level.”73  
The ability of private citizens and public interest watchdogs to monitor 
backroom deals and to control abuses is greatly reduced in the 
international sphere.  International negotiations take place in physically 
remote settings, follow obscure procedures, and may involve foreign 
languages.  Thus, “[a]verage citizens find the international process even 
more opaque than domestic lawmaking.”74  By contrast, organized 
special interests often employ international lobbyists and enjoy 
privileged access to their national delegations.  At the same time, “the 
global scale of regulation allows greater rents for interest groups.”75 
McGinnis and Movsesian also worry that if the WTO expands its 
regulatory authority as Guzman envisions, “departmental staffers 
themselves may have interests that diverge from the interests of their 
appointing authorities.”76  Such concerns may be premature given the 
tight leash on which member states have traditionally kept trade 
negotiations.77  Yet, even without such agency problems, vesting 
regulatory policy in international bodies necessarily entails a loss of 
democratic accountability.78  Voters must depend on unelected officials, 
 
72. See McGinnis & Movesian, Against Global Governance, supra note 23, at 355; 
McGinnis & Movesian, World Trade Constitution, supra note 5, at 556–58. 
73. McGinnis & Movesian, Against Global Governance, supra note 23, at 357. 
74. Id.  But see BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, BUSINESS REGULATION, supra note 3, at 
606–07 (arguing that in some circumstances international regulatory policymaking can 
promote transparency and resist regulatory capture by national lobbies). 
75. Id. 
76. Id. (“Given the technical and esoteric nature of much of their work, staffers may 
eventually constitute a distinctive class with a distinctive interest—growing the regulatory 
apparatus of the WTO—that does not reflect the goals of domestic governments, let alone the 
general public.”). 
77. Empirical work by Greg Shaffer casts doubt on the extent to which the WTO 
conforms to a paradigm of centralized policymaking driven by supranational actors.  He 
demonstrates that member nations have zealously guarded their ability to control trade 
agendas and have deliberately confined the scope of the WTO Secretariat to a relatively 
minimalist role.  Gregory S. Shaffer, The World Trade Organization Under Challenge:  
Democracy and the Law and Politics of the WTO’s Treatment of Trade and Environment 
Matters, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 56–61 (2001). 
78. Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Legitimacy and Global Governance:  Why 
Constitutionalizing the WTO Is a Step Too Far, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, LEGITIMACY:  THE 
MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM, supra note 7, at 227, 241–42; 
Keohane & Nye, supra note 59, at 283–85. 
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who are often subject to far less legislative oversight than regulatory 
policymakers at the domestic level, to represent their interests.79  
Policies must be arrived at by consensus between nations that represent 
a diversity of constituencies whose shared commitments cannot be 
presumed.80  Relying on linkage to force agreements on issues when the 
divergence in viewpoint is too great invites perceptions of illegitimacy.81  
When unilateral exercises in linkage result in unequal outcomes, 
accusations of coercion can also arise.  There are, thus, systemic costs to 
relying on linkage to force through one-sided harmonization. 
For all of these reasons, international regulation must be treated 
with suspicion, particularly when negotiated through logrolling.  Unlike 
private contracts that can be presumed to yield mutual benefits, 
regulatory bargains between nations can easily result in “amoral wealth 
transfers”82 between private interests of dubious benefit.  The use of 
linkage strategies to lower the transaction costs and overcome 
distributional roadblocks to harmonization heightens the danger.  
“[E]very government has protectionist interests to pay off and 
regulatory bargaining would permit the logrolling of their disparate 
interests.”83 
The WTO may be particularly susceptible to such distortions of 
 
79. See DONALD G. RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND GLOBAL 
CAPITALISM:  THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 123 (2004) 
(describing how trade negotiators drawn from the “elite” in developing nations were 
“captured” by the pro-IP paradigm peddled by TRIPs proponents leading them to accept 
protection standards contrary to the interests of their countrymen).  In the United States, as 
in most other countries, foreign policy (and especially trade policy) remain the preserve of 
the executive, and Congress has far less opportunity for input.  Trade agreements are 
typically subject to a single, up-or-down vote, with no opportunity to amend specific 
provisions.  Unlike domestic regulations that can easily be overridden by congressional 
statute, international agreements have an equal status to statutory law (and indeed, in several 
countries, treaties enjoy a higher status). 
80. See Kalderimis, supra note 23, at 343 (arguing that the WTO lacks the “social 
legitimacy” to act in regulatory matters on behalf of a diverse global community); McGinnis 
& Movesian, World Trade Constitution, supra note 5, at 564 (“If the WTO were to assume a 
regulatory function, its legitimacy problem would be far more acute.  Quite simply, there is 
no global demos.”). 
81. See Kalderimis, supra note 23, at 343.  See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT 
OF LAW 79–124 (2d ed. 1994) (distinguishing between primary and secondary norms and 
arguing that instantiation of the latter without agreement on the former is fundamentally 
illegitimate). 
82. McGinnis & Movesian, Against Global Governance, supra note 23, at 355. 
83. Id. at 358.  The fact that such deals would be subject to the consensus requirements 
of the WTO provides no assurance that any such consensus among national representatives is 
actually reflective of the interests of the broader publics in whose name they speak.  Id. at 
357–58. 
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policy.  Transparency has never been the norm at the WTO, and 
participation by civil society organizations is virtually non-existent.84  
The single-undertaking, package deals typical of trade rounds make 
logrolling a necessity.85  The complex backroom deal-making required to 
reach agreement also makes it especially difficulty to track hidden 
(possibly last-minute) bargains.  Yet, once enacted, such bargains are 
difficult to revise; the consensus principle on which the WTO operates 
virtually ensures regulatory lock-in because a single nation can block 
attempts to revisit the issue.86 
The WTO’s consensus requirement also encourages deliberately 
ambiguous compromises such that the contents of which can be 
selectively advertised by politicians to their constituents.87  This 
combination of fuzzy language and package deals makes it hard to keep 
track of who is getting what from where.  This disadvantages nations 
with limited resources and hinders efforts to ensure democratic 
accountability in general.  The democratic deficit inherent in 
international lawmaking is further exacerbated by the use of 
streamlined domestic procedures to implement trade agreements, such 
as the U.S. “fast track” authority, which significantly impairs the 
opportunity for legislative oversight.88 
Under the GATT’s original focus on trade liberalization, these 
shortcomings did not arise.  By limiting its remit to “negative 
integration” through prohibitions on trade barriers and progressive 
opening of markets, the GATT ensured mutually beneficial welfare 
gains.89  The reciprocal basis on which such trade liberalization 
proceeded helped to blunt protectionist lobbies by pitting exporter 
interests against them.  Moreover, far from enabling “regulatory 
capture,” trade liberalization is aimed at eliminating regulatory 
barriers.90 
Under these conditions, GATT’s functionalist traditions—
privileging insider dealings over transparency and democratic input—
 
84. See Keohane & Nye, supra note 59, at 270–72. 
85. Trade rounds have varied as to the degree to which all agreements reached are 
subject to the single-undertaking rules.  However, at least the core tariff bindings have been 
consistently subject to this rule of multiple reciprocal tradeoffs negotiated multilaterally and 
agreed to collectively. 
86. McGinnis & Movsesian, Against Global Governance, supra note 23, at 358. 
87. See generally Holmes, supra note 19, at 65; Petersmann, supra note 6, at 124. 
88. McGinnis & Movsesian, World Trade Constitution, supra note 5, at 540. 
89. Petersmann, supra note 6, at 112. 
90. See McGinnis & Movsesian, World Trade Constitution, supra note 5, at 544–48. 
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aroused little concern.  Giving trade experts carte blanche to engage in 
backroom horse trades was seen as advancing enlightened technocratic 
policy.91  In the long run, the theory of comparative advantage ensured 
that trade liberalization would benefit all participants, while the 
principle of reciprocity facilitated the equitable distribution of short-
term sacrifices.  Thus, the very structure of the GATT system ensured 
mutually beneficial outcomes even in the absence of democratic inputs 
or external monitoring.  Furthermore, core principles of GATT such as 
MFN, national treatment, and progressive tarification helped to 
promote transparent outcomes even if the GATT process itself 
remained shrouded in non-transparent dealings.92  Similarly, neutralizing 
the grip of protectionist lobbies arguably served to facilitate democratic 
choice within individual member states.93  Even the seemingly anti-
democratic mechanism of “fast track” legislation can be defended on 
democratic grounds as a necessary safeguard against protectionist 
meddling.94 
However, a succession of GATT rounds has already plucked most of 
the low-hanging fruit among possible trade concessions.  Liberalization 
increasingly involves painful sacrifices for which trade concessions alone 
sometimes prove inadequate to compensate.  As tariff levels have come 
down dramatically, attention has also shifted to non-tariff barriers.  
Defensive measures to control such barriers often entail sanctioning 
limited forays into regulatory harmonization.  Furthermore, as trade 
continues to integrate the global economy, demands for global 
regulation have swollen.  For all of these reasons, the WTO has 
increasingly moved beyond GATT’s focus on “negative” trade 
liberalization to encompass a more robust regulatory agenda.95 
This transition from negative to positive integration threatens to 
undermine the natural balance and self-regulatory features of the 
GATT process.  So long as trade negotiations focused solely on 
eliminating tariffs, such talks could be safely delegated to trade experts, 
 
91. Petersmann, supra note 6, at 112; see Keohane & Nye, supra note 59, at 267–68. 
92. McGinnis & Movsesian, World Trade Constitution, supra note 5, at 547–48.  Most-
favored nation and national treatment function as non-discrimination rules, ensuring equal 
treatment among members states.  Tarification consists of converting quotas and covert 
barriers into more a transparent form of trade barrier—tariffs—which can then be more 
easily targeted by anti-protectionist lobbies.  McGinnis & Movsesian, World Trade 
Constitution, supra note 5, at 548. 
93. McGinnis & Movsesian, Against Global Governance, supra note 23, at 356; 
Petersmann, supra note 6, at  117. 
94. McGinnis & Movsesian, World Trade Constitution, supra note 5, at 542. 
95. See generally Kalderimis, supra note 23, at 316–38 (providing multiple examples). 
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primarily representing producer interests, whose reciprocal concessions 
could be relied on to advance global welfare.  With regulatory 
harmonization on the table, the prospect of reduced global welfare and 
covert protectionism becomes a real concern.  Moreover, as the ambit of 
global trade law expands to impinge on a broader array of policy 
concerns, the set of constituent interests that must be accounted for is 
no longer limited to those of trade ministries and manufacturers.96  The 
democratic shortcomings of the WTO have, thus, become much more 
objectionable.97 
To his credit, Guzman recognizes the need to reconfigure his 
expanded WTO to address non-trade concerns.  However, his 
solution—forming other specialized departments staffed by 
technocrats—seems inadequate.98  The same democratic objections 
would remain applicable to policymaking by insiders whether drawn 
from trade ministries or from any other branch of government.99  
Conversely, more ambitious “stakeholder” or “civil society” models for 
institutional reform present their own democratic flaws, in that they 
would likely privilege “Northern” (rich country) viewpoints over 
“Southern” perspectives.100 
In any case, procedural reforms to ameliorate the problems of 
democratic input and transparency can only go so far.  Even if the WTO 
were to take into account the full range of relevant perspectives, the 
temptation for regulatory policy to be subverted to mercantilist ends 
would remain of concern.101  The tangible, bottom line effects of trade 
 
96. Regulatory harmonization can impact a broad gamut of domestic actors having 
little or no direct connection to trade.  Unlike tariff policies, which primarily affect input 
prices, regulatory policies can affect the ability of ordinary citizens to engage in economic and 
non-economic activities on many levels.  Cf. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS—Round II:  
Should Users Strike Back, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 21, 21 (2004) [hereinafter Dreyfuss, TRIPS—
Round II] (describing how “the free traders who negotiated the GATT worked in an 
environment in which the core concern, reducing market barriers, was viewed as producing . . 
. unmitigated welfare gains [and thus] were not likely to appreciate the social importance, in 
TRIPS, of balancing proprietary interests against public access needs”). 
97. See Petersmann, supra note 6, at 117–18; McGinnis & Movsesian, World Trade 
Constitution, supra note 5, at 564. 
98. Guzman also tentatively raises the possibility of enabling amicus briefs to be 
submitted in the WTO dispute resolution process, which could help broaden input into 
judicial decisions, but would do nothing to widen the input into regulatory policymaking. 
99. See supra notes 75–78 and accompanying text. 
100. See Shaffer, supra note 77, at 62–74 (describing how the move to a “civil society” 
model would privilege wealthy “Northern” non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that 
have superior resources and organizational abilities as compared to their “Southern” 
counterparts). 
101. Cf. Daniel K. Tarullo, Norms and Institutions in Global Competition Policy, 94 
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policy may trump other regulatory concerns that have an importance 
that is harder to quantify in monetary terms.  Trade also commands the 
attention of powerful business interests that (despite formal equality) 
will likely retain readier access to policymakers rather than other lobby 
groups.  So long as the package deals negotiated under Guzman’s 
“Mega Rounds” remained dominated by trade concerns (or are 
perceived to), the tendency to view their contents through the lens of 
trade interest would be hard to overcome.102  Regulatory bargains born 
of strategic linkage could thus facilitate mercantilist aims and private 
rent seeking to the global detriment. 
III.  EVALUATING TRIPS:  A TEST CASE FOR LINKAGE 
Given their apprehensions about regulatory bargaining, it comes as 
no surprise that McGinnis and Movsesian have opposed Guzman’s 
proposal for expanding linkage. 
Interestingly, however, McGinnis and Movsesian do not appear to 
regard TRIPs as an example of the sort of regulatory abuses of which 
they warn.  They suggest that the “danger of amoral wealth transfers is 
different with respect to intellectual property than with respect to other 
substantive regulation.”103  However, a plausible case can be made that 
TRIPs, in fact, exemplifies the subversion of international lawmaking 
that McGinnis and Movsesian predict generally.  There is certainly 
ample reason for concern that the regulatory bargain struck in TRIPs 
was less than optimal.  Moreover, the negative fallout from TRIPs 
arguably extends beyond the confines of the Agreement itself.  To the 
extent that these concerns are valid, TRIPs may not be the model of 
successful linkage that Guzman assumes, but rather the contrary. 
Much ink has been spilled elsewhere debating the pros and cons of 
TRIPs.  Although most would agree that—at least in the short-term—
TRIPs largely inures to the benefit of the developed world at the 
expense of developing nations,104 there is no consensus as to whether 
 
AM. J. INT’L L. 478, 479 (2000) (“No matter how adroitly these two sets of norms are 
reconciled in theory . . . forcing the square peg of competition policy into the round hole of 
trade policy will change the shape of the peg.”). 
102. Cf. Leebron, supra note 8, at 25–26 (“Linking disparate issues into a single regime 
also poses the risk that the policy goals of one of the issue areas will predominate, so that the 
goals of one are effectively sacrificed to the other.  This is a particular danger where . . . the 
institutional structure or bureaucratic players favor one set of policy goals over another.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
103. McGinnis & Movsesian, Against Global Governance, supra note 23, at 359. 
104. See Yu, supra note 2, at 379–386.  But see Edmund W. Kitch, The Patent Policy of 
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Northern gains outweigh Southern losses.  In other words, whether the 
world as a whole has emerged better off as a result of the regulatory 
harmonization of IPR that TRIPs imposes remains unclear.105  The 
relevant calculus goes well beyond balances of trade.  Intellectual 
property rights affect a broad range of domestic actors who may have 
nothing to do with global commerce.  Economists struggle as it is to 
model the optimal level of intellectual property protection within the 
confines of a single domestic system.106  Performing such an assessment 
in the international sphere across a diversity of national systems with 
differing patterns of economic activity, development, and technological 
advancement perhaps amounts to a fool’s errand.107  Therefore, any 
conclusions on this score must be regarded as tentative and contingent.  
That being said, there are two different issues that must be addressed:  
First, is some harmonization of IPR better than no harmonization?  And 
second, if so, did TRIPs arrive at the right level of harmonization?  In 
other words, does TRIPs put in place a level of IP protection that 
ensures an optimal balance between innovation and monopoly power?108   
On the first question, the answer appears to be a definite “maybe.”  
On their face, IPR constitute monopoly barriers in restraint of trade.  
They also restrict access to technology and inhibit the free flow of 
information.  Somewhat paradoxically, however, a plausible case to be 
made is that all of these problems were worse in the pre-TRIPs world of 
inadequate IP protection.  The lack of effective IPR enforcement in 
many countries deterred both IP exports and foreign investment, 
inhibiting global integration and the dissemination of technology.  To 
the extent that one regards globalization as a good thing, harmonization 
of IPR may be credited with overcoming obstacles that stood in its way. 
Intellectual property rights also serve to promote innovation, a 
public good that benefits the world as a whole.  Preventing free riders 
from engaging in sterile copying of IP resources may be necessary to 
 
Developing Countries, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 166 (1994) (arguing that TRIPs was in the 
developing world’s economic self-interest). 
105. It is also necessary to distinguish between short-term and long-term costs and 
benefits to provide a full accounting.  The discussion that follows represents a simplified 
version of the underlying economics. 
106. See MASKUS, supra note 23, at 28–33. 
107. See id. at 33–35; Correa, supra note 48, at 209 (“The available evidence clearly 
suggests that the role of IPRs vary significantly in accordance with productive structures and 
levels of development.”). 
108. A third issue one could raise is whether TRIPs belongs in the WTO.  However, 
this invites a more general debate on the institutional competence and regulatory governance 
that lies beyond the focus of this Article. 
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preserve optimal incentives for further investments in innovation.  
Variants on this argument focus on forms of innovation of special 
relevance to the developing world.  Permitting IP producers protected 
access to enable them to profit from their innovations in developing 
markets provides an incentive for them to develop and to disseminate 
technologies tailored to the specific needs of those nations.109  
Harmonized IPR may also encourage technology transfers and foster 
indigenous innovation in the developing world, which could help reduce 
the current imbalance in IP production. 
Against this, one could argue that IPR are just one factor influencing 
trade and foreign investment decisions, and that nations should be free 
to choose their own mix of regulatory responses to balance globalization 
and innovation against other priorities.110  Indeed, there may be a benefit 
to regulatory competition between nations in helping to promote more 
efficient tradeoffs in policymaking.  Moreover, without adequate access 
to off-shore technologies, developing nations may arguably end up 
falling further behind the technological rat race.  Existing IPR models 
offer insufficient assurance that such access will occur on affordable 
terms.111  The ability to appropriate IP goods directly, whether through 
compulsory licenses or unsanctioned copying, may outweigh the 
marginal benefits that developing nations stand to gain from IP 
harmonization. 
Moreover, regardless of the economic merits, the political reality 
going into TRIPs was that most developing countries remained deeply 
unconvinced of the value of Western IPR.112  Foisting a full-fledged IP 
 
109. Anti-malarial medications are often cited as an example of a product need that 
Western pharmaceutical companies have ignored because of a lack of market incentives.  
Some have argued that this market failure arises from the absence of effective patent 
protection for pharmaceuticals in nations suffering from malaria; thus, the implementation of 
TRIPs may alleviate the problem.  See MASKUS, supra note 23, at 156.  However, patent 
rights are not enough to create a market:  there must also be the means to pay for 
medications in sufficient quantity to offset development costs. 
110. Cf. Correa, supra note 48, at 209 (arguing that “in the area of intellectual property 
‘one size does not fit all’”). 
111. In theory, since IPRs are territorial rights, IP producers should be able to engage 
in price discrimination to sell their products to developing world customers at affordable rates 
without undercutting their rich world markets.  Yet, market imperfections stemming from a 
fear of reimportation, inadequate returns sufficient to offset the costs of overseas marketing, 
or simple inertia may stand in the way.  Accordingly, some form of compulsory licenses may 
be necessary to bridge the gap.  See Netanel, supra note 63, at 322–28. 
112. See Richard E. Vaughan, Defining Terms in the Intellectual Property Protection 
Debate:  Are the North and South Arguing Past Each Other When We Say “Property”?  A 
Lockean, Confucian, and Islamic Comparison, 2 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 307 (1996).  To 
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regime upon them in exchange for unrelated trade concessions creates a 
kind of regulatory non-sequitur:  Such countries become responsible for 
enforcing a set of regulatory norms that have no intrinsic raison d’être 
except as a quid pro quo.113  IP protection is not cheap.114  Establishing a 
functioning patent system, in particular, requires a specialized, technical 
staff.115  Southern resentment of such burdens as Northern impositions 
(however, fairly compensated in the bigger scheme) is unavoidable and 
may lead to broader perceptions of illegitimacy directed against the 
WTO.  The lack of any organic commitment to enforcing such norms 
can set up a dynamic of either systemic transgressions and hence future 
trade friction, as has been the case with China116 or, perversely, over-
 
the extent IPR existed in Southern legal regimes pre-TRIPs, they often sprang from radically 
different premises.  See, e.g., Gerard Bodeker, Traditional Medical Knowledge, Intellectual 
Property Rights & Benefit Sharing, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 785, 786–87 (2003) 
(describing protection of folklore and traditional knowledge enacted under auspices of the 
African Intellectual Property Organization). 
113. One can imagine, for example, a court in a hypothetical Central American country 
being presented with a novel question of patent law under that nation’s freshly minted patent 
statute.  Obliged to inquire into the underlying purpose of the patent system to resolve an 
ambiguity, the court is told that the purpose of protecting patents is to ensure access to 
Yankee markets for the local banana industry.  Where does one go from there? 
114. PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM:  WHO 
OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? 147 (2002) [hereinafter DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE, 
INFORMATION FEUDALISM] (“Developing nations would have to find tens of millions of 
dollars to set up the infrastructure of intellectual property protection . . . that would largely 
service the needs of foreign rights holders.”).  Some of this expenditure can be recouped 
through user fees, but only at the risk of making the acquisition of IPR prohibitively 
expensive for anyone other than rich multinational companies (i.e., effectively denying local 
actors access to IP protection in their country—discriminatory pricing by nationality being 
prohibited under TRIPS). 
115. One could, of course, piggyback on the patent prosecution efforts of other 
nations, on the assumption that most applicants will also have sought patents elsewhere.  
However, such attempts to function on the cheap invite abuses by applicants and raises the 
potential of over-enforcement.  See James Love, Access to Medicine and Compliance with the 
WTO TRIPS Accord:  Models for State Practice in Developing Countries, in GLOBAL 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:  KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS AND DEVELOPMENT 77 (Peter 
Drahos & Ruth Mayne eds., 2d ed. 2002). 
116. From a Northern standpoint, China represents the most glaring example of a 
“rogue nation” perceived to systematically flout IPR.  Yet, such transgressions are entirely 
predictable.  The absence of any indigenous tradition of intellectual property (and indeed a 
cultural tradition that values copying) arguably renders the whole project illegitimate in the 
eyes of the Chinese public.  See generally WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN 
ELEGANT OFFENSE:  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION (1995) 
(describing intellectual tradition in China based on reverence for and imitation of ancient 
“classics”).  Even assuming complete good faith on the part of the Chinese government, 
systemic under-enforcement of IPR in China could thus be expected. 
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enforcement due to unfamiliarity with permissible exceptions117 and/or 
capture by multinationals of the new-fledged IPR regimes;118 all of which 
can fuel further indigenous resentment.  So long as IPR remain an alien 
graft upon the body of indigenous law, the prospect of their successful 
implementation, thus, remains problematic.119 
On the other hand, IP harmonization cannot be viewed in isolation.  
By the time the Uruguay Round began, the open appropriation of IP 
goods and, in particular, blatant forms of piracy and counterfeiting had 
grown into a major irritant to global trade.  The United States’ response 
of unilateral “Special 301” sanctions in retaliation for such IP “theft” 
had engendered further bad will.120  A multilateral agreement offered 
the advantage of disciplining these interventions and defusing future 
conflicts.121  Yet, WIPO had proven incapable of reaching a consensus 
on a baseline IPR agreement.  Meanwhile, agricultural and textile 
protection of rich world markets had stubbornly resisted prior trade 
liberalization efforts.  It was unclear if the South had enough bargaining 
clout in purely trade terms to overcome that resistance.  Whatever the 
merits of IP harmonization on its own, one could argue that TRIPs filled 
a necessary function in the political economy of global trade 
negotiations without which the WTO itself might not have been 
achieved.  On this view, a case can be made that IP harmonization was 
imperative on political grounds and that the South had just as much to 
gain from linkage as the North. 
Assuming this was so, it brings us to the second question:  Did 
TRIPs get the level right?  Too much IP protection can deter 
innovation, obstruct the free flow of information, and lead to other 
 
117. See Dreyfuss, TRIPS—Round II, supra note 96, at 25 (noting that TRIPs does not 
catalog permissible user rights retained under its general rubric, thereby raising the risk that a 
literal incorporation of its prescriptions regarding IPR without mention of such exceptions 
would lead to a higher level of protection than that in the United States). 
118. See DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM, supra note 114, at 
204–05. 
119. See RICHARDS, supra note 79, at 9 (noting problems with interpretation and 
applications of externally imposed IPR); Netanel, supra note 63, at 274 (describing problems 
with “legal transplants”).  H.L.A. Hart’s account of primary norms (i.e., acceptance of the 
idea of intellectual property) serving as a prerequisite before secondary norms (i.e., the terms 
of a particular IPR regime) can have any meaning seems apposite.  HART, supra note 81, at 
79–124.  I am grateful to Adam Mosoff for this point. 
120. See MASKUS, supra note 23, at 1. 
121. See Adronico Oduogo Adede, Origins and History of the TRIPS Negotiation, in 
TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE:  DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES ON TRIPS, TRADE AND 
SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 30, at 23, 31; cf. Leebron, supra note 8, at 26 (noting that 
“linkage will often be preferred to unilateralism”). 
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inefficiencies associated with monopoly power.122  Too little protection 
would also detract from innovation and perpetuate the imbalances that 
preceded TRIPs (albeit in reduced form) to the extent that developed 
nations continued to exceed the floor of IPR minima that the 
Agreement established.123  Again, a definitive assessment of optimal IPR 
levels defies current economic capabilities.  Nonetheless, a number of 
circumstantial elements suggest that TRIPs erred on the high side; that 
is, it set mandatory minimum levels of IPR that conferred more power 
to IP producers than might have been warranted. 
First, the fact that TRIPs amounts to an upward harmonization, 
imposing essentially rich world IP standards on developing nations, 
appears problematic.  A number of commentators have argued that IP 
standards in developed nations, especially in the United States, have 
become inflated in recent years, reaching excessive levels of 
protection.124  Therefore, these standards are already suspect in the eyes 
of many.125 
Even if such standards were appropriate for rich countries, 
expanding IPR to include developing nations would, on its face, seems 
to warrant a reduced level of protection overall.  Broadening the market 
protected by IPR makes an expanded source of rents available to IP 
producers.  In the absence of increased competition, this would reduce 
the time required to ensure an adequate return on their investments.  
 
122. See, e.g., Netanel, supra note 63, at 222 (noting that “copyright may sometimes 
impede democratization unless substantial limits are place on copyright holder rights”). 
123. Referring to an overall “level” of IP protection amounts to an oversimplification.  
Not only must IPR be separated into the different regimes, copyright, patent, trademarks, 
etc., but also the cluster of rights and exceptions both as to the scope and the duration of 
protection granted in each individual regime represents individual variables in which its 
various permutations must be considered separately to model the effects of a particular IP 
regime. 
124. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 242–67 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing the extension of the copyright term as exceeding any plausible incentive-based 
limit); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS:  THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A 
CONNECTED WORLD (2001) (questioning the need for property rights in a cyber-connected 
society); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad for Business, 16 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 263, 274 (2000) (questioning the value of 
business method patents and critiquing the general trend in IP law toward excessive 
protection without any underlying rationale); Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and 
the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687 (1999) (critiquing excessive propertization 
of trademark law); William Patry, The Failure of the American Copyright System:  Protecting 
the Idle Rich, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 907 (1997). 
125. See MASKUS, supra note 23, at 65–66 (arguing that the U.S. intellectual property 
“regime has become overly protectionist by almost any utilitarian standard,” and that “it 
seems unwise to advocate the exportation of such protection to developing nations”). 
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Because IP producers are overwhelmingly concentrated in rich 
countries, such competition is unlikely to arise.  Instead, bringing 
developing nations into a global IP regime gives IP producers access to 
essentially captive markets.  Therefore, at least for products developed 
for a worldwide market, an equivalent incentive to innovate could be 
obtained at reduced levels of IP protection.126 
Notwithstanding the overall logic of lower protection, IP producer 
nations have a vested interest in moving standards upward.  Because IP 
exports externalize the losses from deadweight monopolies to 
purchasers abroad while internalizing the benefits as a positive balance 
of trade, producer nations might rationally pursue higher levels of 
protection in a global IP regime than they would otherwise opt for in a 
purely domestic system.127  Under such conditions, IP importers (for the 
most part in the South) would end up subsidizing the added costs of 
such supra-optimal protection. 
Assuming arguendo that TRIPs represents such a supra-optimal 
outcome, the fact that developing nations received offsetting 
compensation in the form of agricultural and textile concessions hardly 
rectifies this fundamental imbalance.  Trade concessions, even if 
unilateral, generally benefit both the recipient and the grantor alike 
because trade protection is fundamentally inefficient.128  By contrast, 
excessive IP protection can hurt all sides.  Developing nations, as IP 
importers, emerge the most visibly disadvantaged, because they are 
forced to pay higher rents for longer periods.  To the extent that 
Southern nations have traded away access to technology for textile and 
agricultural markets, the long-term implications of this bargain are 
particularly troubling.  As Rochelle Dreyfuss has pointed out, 
technology is a cumulative enterprise and the developing world risks 
falling further and further behind, stuck in a neo-colonial trap as 
producers of primary goods and basic commodities.129 
 
126. For products specifically targeting the needs developing nations, the opposite 
might apply.  Because poorer nations may pay lower rents, higher levels of protection might 
be needed to ensure an adequate return.  Nonetheless, this special case hardly undermines 
the economic logic of reduced protection.  Instead, the problem can be tackled through sui 
generis solutions.  An example of the latter would be recent proposals in the United States to 
offer extended patent protection on existing drugs as an incentive for pharmaceutical 
companies to invest in risky and potentially unprofitable safeguards against bioterrorism.  See 
Marc Kaufman, Bioterrorism Response Hampered by Problem of Profit, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 
2005, at A5 (describing proposal for “wildcard patents”). 
127. Guzman, supra note 27, at 316. 
128. See Bhagwati, After Seattle, supra note 7, at 62 n.1. 
129. Dreyfuss, TRIPS—Round II, supra note 96, at 28–30 (condemning TRIPs as 
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Even rich countries may emerge worse off overall if protection levels 
rise too far.  Not all monopoly deadweight losses can be externalized; 
some remain the burden of domestic consumers and others may be re-
internalized to the extent that the costs of IPR enforcement in 
developing nations hurt collateral U.S. interests.130  Moreover, as 
existing IP holders gain undue leverage to stifle secondary 
inventors/creators, this will hinder innovation rather than foster it.131 
To explain why rich country negotiators would pursue IP standards 
antithetical to their own national interests, one must consider the 
political economy underlying such negotiations.  TRIPs did not emerge 
on the Uruguay Round agenda out of an abstract concern over fostering 
global innovation.132  Rather, TRIPs was negotiated at the behest of 
powerful IP producer interests, primarily in the United States, Europe 
and Japan.133  These industries mobilized concerted lobbying efforts to 
propose specific provisions that advanced their corporate interests.134  
Naturally, such lobbying favored stronger protection designed to 
maximize monopoly rents tied directly to their own bottom lines.135 
While producer lobbies have traditionally enjoyed privileged access 
 
resting on an “unconscionable bargain” that condemns developing countries to a future of 
industrial obsolescence). 
130. An example of such potential re-internalization of costs could have arisen in the 
recent AIDS pharmaceutical showdown had the hardline stance of Big Pharma prevailed and 
an entire continent succumbed to the pandemic.  The long-term costs of the socio-economic 
disruption and political instability that would have resulted could easily have outweighed the 
value of the patent rights being contested.  See Francis Mangeni, Implementing the TRIPS 
Agreement in Africa, in TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE:  DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES ON 
TRIPS, TRADE AND SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 30, at 219, 230 (“Impoverishing and 
leaving destitute entire populations in developing countries is economic suicide for developed 
countries and industry lobbies.”). 
131. See Dreyfuss, TRIPS—Round II, supra note 96, at 22. 
132. See Petersmann, supra note 6, at 120–22 (arguing that TRIPs was not based on any 
serious cost-benefit analysis of global welfare effects but was rather a political deal brokered 
on behalf of IP producers). 
133. BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, BUSINESS REGULATION, supra note 3, at 63.  The 
strongest proponents of globalized IPR were centered in the software, content (film and 
music), and pharmaceutical industries.  One commentator goes so far as to claim that “[i]n 
effect, twelve corporations made public law for the world.”  SUSAN SELL, PRIVATE POWER, 
PUBLIC LAW:  THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 96 (2003); see 
also Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting:  The TRIPs Agreement and the New Dynamics of 
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 19 (2004). 
134. See Yu, supra note 2, at 405–06 (citing SELL, supra note 133, at 8).   
135. Jagdish Bhagwati, After Seattle:  Free Trade and the WTO, 77 INT’L AFFAIRS 15, 
26 (2001) (describing TRIPs as “turn[ing] the WTO into a royalty-collection agency” for the 
benefit of IP producers). 
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to trade negotiators,136 WTO negotiations are difficult for consumer 
advocates and other non-producer interests to monitor, let alone 
influence.  Meanwhile, opposition from developing nations could simply 
be “bought off” by trade concessions.  In the absence of a 
counterbalancing impetus to safeguard the public domain or legislate in 
favor of user rights, the provisions of TRIPs focused primarily on 
defining the rights of IP owners, rather than on their limitations.137 
That TRIPs was negotiated in the context of a global trade 
agreement (as opposed to a stand-alone treaty on intellectual property) 
may have also encouraged mercantilist biases of negotiators to supplant 
a broader reckoning of national interest.138  Given the powerful 
comparative advantage rich countries enjoy in IP, harmonization 
promised to unlock new export markets and to ensure a more favorable 
balance of trade.  Such concrete, short-term objectives could be 
expected to eclipse more nebulous, fundamentally unquantifiable 
concerns over optimizing innovation.139 
Furthermore, IP treaties (of which TRIPs is no exception) typically 
act as a one-way ratchet, whereby a minimum floor of IPR becomes 
entrenched without any corresponding ceiling.140  There is, thus, a 
natural tendency for standards to creep upwards over time as rich 
country negotiators agree to match each other’s highest levels.  While 
regulatory harmonization is often justified as preventing a “race to the 
bottom,” the dynamics of international harmonization risk the opposite 
danger, namely a “race to the top.”  IP harmonization may, thus, offer a 
means for IP producers to enact an end-run around domestic 
opposition, using international treaties to achieve a level of protection 
they could not attain by domestic means.  Indeed, the mere prospect of 
 
136. Shaffer, supra note 77, at 52–54; Tarullo, supra note 101, at 488. 
137. Dreyfuss, TRIPS—Round II, supra note 96, at 25–28; BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, 
BUSINESS REGULATION, supra note 3, at 139. 
138. See Reichman, supra note 48, at 456 (“[T]he big multinational firms with greatest 
access to USTR keep on pressing for ever higher levels of intellectual property protection, 
regardless of the costs, and few have bothered to ask the small and medium-sized firms that 
actually drive the U.S. economy whether they would benefit or suffer from such proposals.”). 
139. See Netanel, supra note 63, at 218–20 (describing how TRIPs epitomized “a 
dramatic move to  reconceptualize” intellectual property as a trade issue, “riding roughshod 
over venerable copyright values and the public interest in the process”); cf. Leebron, supra 
note 8, at 26 (describing how linkage can lead to issue biases).  Such myopic tendencies in 
policymaking are consistent with studies in psychology that demonstrate that people assign an 
undue salience to concrete, immediate events that outweigh more important, but distant 
goals. 
140. See Dreyfuss, TRIPS—Round II, supra note 96, at 22. 
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international harmonization has been used to justify increased domestic 
protection.141  As a result, IP agreements have led to higher IP standards, 
even in rich countries.142  Yet, once entrenched, these higher standards 
are difficult to revise downward, even when conditions might otherwise 
justify pulling back.  Over time, one can expect IPR standards to 
continue to migrate toward supra-optimal levels.143 
Therefore, international harmonization of IPR would appear to raise 
the sort of public choice hazards of which McGinnis and Movsesian 
warn.  A mercantilist focus may distort a broader weighing of national 
interest.  Producer lobbies can unite around their shared interest in 
regulatory protectionism,144 while the opposing forces are weak and 
fragmented, with domestic opposition unable to mobilize effectively at 
the international level and international resistance easily overcome by 
logrolling.  Finally, regulatory “lock-in” ensures that standards follow a 
one-way ratchet upward towards greater protectionism, leaving no 
discretion to revise standards downward to meet changing needs.  In 
theory, such regulatory flaws could manifest even in the absence of a 
direct link to trade.  However, without linkage, IP harmonization would 
never have gotten off the ground. 
Other features specific to the negotiating history of TRIPs reinforce 
the suspicion that the Agreement may have been the product of a 
flawed regulatory process.  Although the United States had long sought 
to make IPR part of global trade negotiations and adopted unilateral 
measures designed to force the issue,145 the original Uruguay Round 
 
141. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 205–08 (2003) (finding that the United States 
needs to “play a leadership role” in setting international copyright standards); H.R. 374, 
104th Cong. (1st Sess. 1995) (same for trademark law). 
142. There is some tendency to harmonize upwards toward the highest common 
denominator.  Even without an actual agreement, domestic IP lobbies can promote higher 
standards pour encourages les autres (i.e., to set a good example).  See 537 U.S. at 198, 205–08. 
143. The optimal level of IP protection varies as technological and industrial factors 
evolve.  Ideally, the precise mix of rights, exceptions, and limitations in an IP regime should 
be adjusted over time to maintain a dynamic equilibrium between incentives and monopoly 
losses.  Because international treaties permit only upward variations and then lock in the 
higher standards through subsequent agreements, the ability of domestic regulators to 
maintain an optimal balance would be gradually foreclosed.  See Dreyfuss, TRIPS—Round II, 
supra note 96, at 22. 
144. The software industry has recently had something of a change of heart regarding 
IP protection, at least within the United States, with several leading companies expressing 
concerns that software and business methods patents have gotten out of hand.  However, 
most software firms continue to support expanded IPR abroad. 
145. Efforts to legislate IPR into GATT dated back to Tokyo Round when anti-
copying provisions had been proposed and rejected.  In 1988, the U.S. Congress designated 
inadequate IP protection as a form of “unfair trade” subject to unilateral retaliation under 
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agenda set out a rather modest IP agenda for discussion.146  Instead, the 
ambitions of IP proponents appear to have expanded as the Round 
progressed.  An initial focus on preventing trading of counterfeit goods 
evolved into proposals for a full-blown IPR regime with detailed 
standards governing all of the major categories of intellectual 
property.147  Moreover, while the original agenda contemplated both 
creating limits to IPR as well as establishing a floor of a minimum 
protection, the end product contained only the latter.  Rich countries 
dominated the drafting of the final agreement and were able to shape it 
to their interests.148 
Furthermore, the linkage attached to TRIPs was not limited to 
agricultural and textile concessions.  As the Uruguay Round advanced, 
the United States made it clear that the entire package of agreements 
being negotiated in the Round hinged on the United States achieving its 
IPR goals and threatened to unilaterally retaliate against individual 
hold-outs.149  Accordingly, some commentators have argued that there 
was a coercive element to the TRIPs negotiations in which developing 
nations were bullied into a deal against their better judgment.150 
Finally, it is worth recalling that the Uruguay Round represented a 
quantum leap in global trade law.  TRIPs represented only one of 
several landmark agreements ultimately adopted, not the least of which 
was the establishment of the WTO itself.151  Many trade delegations, 
particularly those from developing nations with limited resources, may 
 
section 301 of the 1971 Unfair Trading Act (section 301).  See RICHARDS, supra note 79, at 
125. 
146. See World Trade Organization, Punta del Este Declaration, Draft Ministerial 
Declaration of 20 September 1986, at 7–8, WT/MIN(86)/W/19 (establishing as an agenda item 
for Uruguay Round the “aim to clarify GATT provisions and elaborate as appropriate new 
rules . . . to develop a multilateral framework of principles, rules and disciplines dealing with 
international trade in counterfeit goods”); see also DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS 
AGREEMENT:  DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 11 (2d ed. 2003); Adede, supra note 121, 
at 25 (arguing that the “inclusion of TRIPS on the agenda was a last-minute political 
compromise [which] ‘featured almost as a footnote on a crowded agenda . . . and it was 
uncertain whether that contentious item would survive the end of the round’”). 
147. GERVAIS, supra note 146, at 10–26 (recounting the history of TRIPs 
negotiations). 
148. See Peter Drahos, Negotiating Intellectual Property Rights:  Between Coercion and 
Dialogue, in GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:  KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS AND 
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 115, at 167–69. 
149. See id. at 169–70; see also id. at 178 (noting that the European Union also applied 
its own unilateral pressure). 
150. See Drahos, supra note 148, at 169–172; Dreyfuss, TRIPS—Round II, supra note 
96, at 29; Yu, supra note 2, at 373–75 (describing “coercion” narrative). 
151. For a partial list, see supra note 3. 
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have been unable to keep track of the evolving provisions of TRIPs.152  
In addition, because of the pressure to conclude an IP agreement, 
troublesome issues were resolved through compromises that relied on 
ambiguous language to finesse substantive disagreements.153  Most of the 
ambiguities concern exceptions to IPR; the rights themselves are clearly 
defined.  Some commentators have argued that TRIPs amounted to 
something of a swindle foisted by the North on an unsuspecting South.154  
Such accusations of bad faith have intensified as rich nations have failed 
to make good on their promises of offsetting agricultural and textile 
liberalization.155 
In any case, such ambiguities represent unfinished arguments that 
continue to fester as a source of acrimony.  IP producers stand accused 
of twisting TRIPs’ language to achieve an in terrorem effect.156  More 
generally, the disagreements reflect a fundamental gulf in conceptions 
of IPR whereby one man’s piracy is another’s intellectual commons.  
The AIDS pharmaceutical debacle provides a vivid example of the 
heated rhetoric such conflicting perspectives can generate.  Where Big 
Pharma saw the wholesale appropriation of their property, others saw a 
necessary humanitarian response to a global health crisis.157 
All of these reasons underscore the concern that, far from being an 
unqualified success, the use of linkage to bring TRIPs into the WTO 
resulted in a flawed regulatory bargain that might have done more harm 
than good.  Forcing an issue into the WTO on which its membership had 
not yet achieved anything close to consensus might ultimately have been 
counterproductive.158  Admittedly, it is difficult—and perhaps 
premature—to judge.  Some of the criticisms of TRIPs overstate the 
case.  TRIPs was essentially completed in final form at least one year 
 
152. See Yu, supra note 2, at 375–76 (describing “ignorance” narrative); see also 
Shaffer, supra note 77, at 44–45 (noting that many smaller developing nations cannot afford 
more than a skeletal staff—sometimes only a single diplomat—to represent them in the 
WTO). 
153. DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM, supra note 114, at 139. 
154. See Yu, supra note 2, at 375–76 (describing “ignorance” narrative). 
155. See id. 
156. See Reichman, supra note 48, at 452–54 (describing “pound of flesh mentality”). 
157. The AIDS pharmaceutical dispute focused on ambiguities such as the provision in 
TRIPs governing the use of compulsory licenses, with disagreement as to the scope of 
“emergency” exception and the measures authorized thereunder.  See TRIPs Agreement, 
supra note 1, art. 30. 
158. Cf. Leebron, supra note 8, at 26 (stating that “it seems inappropriate to use 
linkage to create pressure to reach an agreement on a subject on which few believe there 
should a multilateral agreement at all”). 
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before the conclusion of the Uruguay Round; thus, it is difficult to argue 
that developing nations were railroaded into an eleventh-hour 
settlement.  Moreover, no agreement is perfect, and TRIPs does have 
enough “wiggle room” to potentially avert some of the worse-case 
scenarios.159  Much will depend on the interpretations given to TRIPs’ 
more ambiguous provisions.  The delayed implementation permitted for 
developing nations also means that its economic and political 
consequences remain largely unknown.160  Moreover, far from being 
solely a one-way ratchet, the understanding on compulsory licensing 
adopted in the Doha Declaration and its sequel did affect something of 
roll-back, at least measured against the most maximalist interpretations 
of TRIPs.161 
Nonetheless, the perception remains in many circles that TRIPs 
amounted to a one-sided deal forced down the throats of the developing 
world through a combination of false promises and coercive pressure.162  
Such perceptions continue to poison negotiations over current IP 
issues.163  Plans in the United States for a “TRIPs II” have been shelved 
in the face of Southern intransigence.  Instead, the United States and 
the European Union have turned to bilateral agreements to implement 
so-called “TRIPs+” provisions.164  Developing nations have pursued 
their own “regime-shifting” strategies to counterbalance TRIPs by 
building favorable IP-related norms into other international 
agreements.165  Non-governmental organizations have also been active in 
fulminating against TRIPs.  The AIDS pharmaceutical debacle gave 
 
159. See Reichman, supra note 48, at 459. 
160. Developing nations were granted a five-year delay before the obligations of 
TRIPs came into force, while the least developed had a ten-year phase-in that only expired 
this year.  See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 65, 66.  Under the Doha Declaration, the 
latter were granted an additional ten years before pharmaceutical patents had to be 
protected.  See Helfer, supra note 133, at 5. 
161. See generally Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO Medicines Decision:  World 
Pharmaceutical Trade and the Protection of Public Health, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 317 (2005) 
[hereinafter Abbott, Medicines Decision] (providing background to Doha Declaration and 
account of negotiating positions). 
162. If anything, these critical perspectives have increased and strengthened in 
vehemence over time, as phase-in deadlines for implementation have begun to expire.  See 
Helfer, supra note 133, at 3, 24. 
163. Cf. Leebron, supra note 8, at 26 (noting the risk that using linkage to bring in 
parties hostile to a set of policy norms may undermine further development of such norms). 
164. Pugatch, supra note 44, at 442–62 (providing empirical analysis of recent 
agreements). 
165. See Helfer, supra note 133, at 55–61 (describing resistance strategies used by 
developing nations to generate counterregime norms in alternative fora that can be used to 
oppose or mitigate the effects of TRIPs). 
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them a golden opportunity to cast TRIPs as the ugly face of 
globalization run amok.  Attacks on “biopiracy” also serve to highlight 
rhetorically the perceived one-sidedness of the IPR codified in TRIPs.166  
While opposition to IP harmonization was perhaps inevitable, such 
antagonism has been fueled by sense of illegitimacy over the process by 
which TRIPs came about and the narrow coterie of interests the 
Agreement is seen to serve. 
Moreover, the bad will accumulated over IP issues has spilled over 
into negotiations on other trade issues.  Commentators have linked the 
stalemate in recent trade negotiations, in part, to lingering resentment 
and distrust over TRIPs.167  While Northern interest groups have seen 
TRIPs as pioneering an effective form of linkage that has inspired a 
myriad other “trade and” causes to attempt to copy its playbook,168 
Southern negotiators have adamantly refused to budge on any of them.  
These conflicting views of linkage contributed to the breakdown of both 
the Seattle and Cancún trade talks.169  The WTO may, thus, be the 
victim of unrealistic expectations and cumulative distrust—both too 
little linkage as well as too much.  While the factors driving these 
phenomena go well beyond IPR and TRIPs, at least some degree of 
culpability may be placed at their doorstep. 
Granted, some of the bad will associated with TRIPs has to do with 
unfilled promises, as opposed to the contents of the Agreement per se.170  
Similarly, the heated protests engendered by the AIDS pharmaceutical 
crisis arguably had more to do with maximalist positions adopted by Big 
 
166. “Biopiracy” is used as a pejorative to describe the exploitative acts of Western 
“bioprospectors” who convert natural resources found in developing nations—often 
identified by drawing on the traditional knowledge (TK) of indigenous peoples—into 
valuable IP products without adequately compensating the indigenous communities from 
which the resources were identified and/or taken.  The term “biopiracy” provides a deliberate 
echo of the “anti-piracy” rhetoric which Western proponents of TRIPs used to mobilize 
support for their cause.  By drawing such parallels between “Western” IP and TK, 
proponents of TK protection seek to assimilate the issue into the larger IPR debate.  See 
Graham Dutfield, TRIPS-Related Aspects of Traditional Knowledge, 33 CASE W. RES. J. 
INT’L L. 233, 237–38 (2001). 
167. See, e.g., MASKUS, supra note 23, at 239–40. 
168. Bhagwati, After Seattle, supra note 7, at 59. 
169. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text; cf. Bhagwati, After Seattle, supra 
note 7, at 59 (describing the “three legs” of the WTO mutating into an even more unwieldy 
“centipede” whose forward progress grinds to a halt). 
170. Developing nations are still awaiting the liberalization in the agricultural and 
textile markets that they were promised in exchange for IPR.  Technical assistance and 
technology transfers called for under TRIPs are also seen as falling short of expectations.  See 
Yu, supra note 2, at 379–386. 
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Pharma and its White House allies than the intrinsic one-sidedness of 
TRIPs itself.171  Still, these later conflicts can be traced, in part, to the 
sub-optimal circumstances in which the TRIPs Agreement was 
negotiated.  The complex dynamics of the Uruguay Round arguably 
fostered incomplete bargains and ambiguous drafting that set the stage 
for confrontations down the road.  Such flawed compromises 
encouraged actors on both sides to believe that they had gotten more 
than was actually agreed to, thereby lending a sting of betrayal to the 
inevitable confrontations.172 
Perhaps some version of TRIPs was inevitable and necessary to 
advance global integration.  But was there a better way to go about 
negotiating that might have led to a more congenial outcome?  Guzman 
may be correct to argue that TRIPs could only have been achieved 
through linkage.  However, this does not necessarily justify an 
unqualified endorsement of such linkage strategies.  Regardless of the 
actual merits of TRIPs, the negative concerns and perceptions it has 
generated should give one pause before calling for further emulation of 
the formula that gave rise to it.  Even if TRIPs is not as bad as some 
claim, other regulatory agreements born of linkage may be worse.173  
The risk of linkage is not only that flawed agreements might result, but 
also that a cumulative legacy of distrust and resentment will prevail.174  
The potential paralysis that proliferating linkage claims could induce 
must be reckoned with as well. 
Ultimately, some forms of regulatory linkage may be necessary to 
continue the processes of economic liberalization and global integration 
that the GATT pioneered.  However, left unregulated, linkage 
strategies may do more harm than good.  The general presumption 
should be that linkages to advance regulatory harmonization are 
disfavored.175  Without better assurances, such strategies arguably should 
be discouraged.  This begs the question of whether some form of formal 
controls on linkage should be adopted, either substantive or procedural 
in nature. 
 
171. See Reichman, supra note 48, at 452–56. 
172. Cf. id. at 460 (“The hard truth is that these same governments compromised far 
more, and obtained far less, than the various trade associations can afford to admit.”). 
173. There is no reason to think that TRIPs, coming as but the first in what might be a 
long line of regulatory harmonization measures, has charted the farthest depths possible of 
abusive linkage. 
174. See Tarullo, supra note 101, at 494 (describing the “system costs” of linkage in 
causing further “strain on the legitimacy and institutional integrity of the WTO itself”). 
175. See Leebron, supra note 8, at 26. 
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IV.  CONTROLLING LINKAGE:  SOME POSSIBLE APPROACHES 
A.  Just Say NO:  A Total Ban on Linkage 
Perhaps the simplest solution would be to abolish linkage strategies.  
This approach is advocated by McGinnis and Movsesian who 
disapprove of regulatory harmonization on principle and want the WTO 
to return to its core focus on trade.176  They oppose linkage because it 
lowers the transaction costs to (bad) regulatory bargains.177  As a result, 
they appear to favor a total ban on any form of regulatory linkage 
between trade and non-trade issues, whether procedural or 
substantive.178 
Their approach has the benefit of clarity.  However, McGinnis and 
Movsesian proceed to make an exception for TRIPs, which they see as 
sufficiently related to trade to justify inclusion in the WTO.179  Yet, as 
Jagdish Bhagwati has observed, if IPR qualify as “trade-related,” then 
almost anything can.180  This points to a problem with the trade purist 
approach:  however much one opposes linkages in general, the 
temptation to make exceptions remains powerful.  Indeed, now that 
TRIPs has set a precedent, this temptation has become almost 
irresistible.  As a practical matter, few countries could be expected to 
rule out future linkages entirely. 
One might also question whether the WTO can continue its work of 
trade liberalization without incorporating some degree of linkage for at 
least three reasons.  First, successive GATT rounds have already hit the 
easy targets.  The main trade sectors left to be liberalized—agriculture 
in particular—require politically painful concessions that will not come 
easily.  In order to pry open Northern markets for primary goods, 
developing nations need to have something to offer in exchange; 
 
176. McGinnis & Movsesian, Against Global Governance, supra note 23, at 365. 
177. Others go even further in the case of TRIPs and appear to equate strategic linkage 
with coercion, arguing that the “package deal” structure of the Uruguay Round meant that 
developing nations were “coerced” into signing the parts they did not want to get the ones 
they did.  See supra notes 149–50 and accompanying text. 
178. McGinnis & Movsesian, Against Global Governance, supra note 23, at 358. 
179. Id. at 359. 
180. See Bhagwati, After Seattle, supra note 7, at 58.  An attempt to establish a 
“substantial relation” to trade test would parallel the U.S. Supreme Court’s efforts to supply 
a meaningful boundary to the Commerce Clause, a line that has proven notoriously difficult 
to draw.  Cf. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down the Violence 
Against Women Act as beyond Congress’ Commerce Clause power); United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down the ban on guns in schools as beyond Congress’ 
Commerce Clause power). 
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regulatory harmonization is one of the few cards with which they have 
to play.181 
Second, as tariff levels have come down, the WTO has been forced 
to police regulatory policy as an alternative source of covert 
protectionism.  The standard setting agreements negotiated as part of 
the Uruguay package represent steps in this direction.182  While such 
purely “defensive” harmonization does not raise the same dangers as 
the affirmative mandates imposed by TRIPs (and thus need not be 
subjected to the procedural controls contemplated here),183  not all 
regulatory issues can be guided by the relatively objective standards that 
these agreements rely on.  More aggressive forms of harmonization may 
be sought in other areas to preemptively foreclose the prospect of 
unilateral protectionism.184 
Third, even without protectionist motives, more and more 
regulatory issues have impacts on trade, and vice versa.  Many argue 
that the WTO’s very legitimacy depends on its ability to balance trade 
against other policy concerns in an even-handed manner.185  In this 
respect, the case for linkage transcends individual programmatic goals.  
As globalization advances in an increasingly interconnected world, the 
need to negotiate comprehensive policy solutions makes linkage almost 
 
181. Developing economies account for only a small share of total global gross 
domestic product.  However, they are disproportionately dependent on agriculture and other 
primary goods.  The unfortunate reality is that the marginal value these countries have as 
export markets for rich countries may be dwarfed by the political clout wielded by domestic 
farm lobbies.  On the other hand, developing nations generally are “underregulated” by 
comparison to their richer peers.  Such regulatory laxities are often viewed as a form of unfair 
trade or “social dumping” by the latter, that then seek to harmonize away the differences.   
Thus, a North-South exchange of trade concessions for regulatory harmonization along the 
lines of TRIPs may be the only way of extracting significant trade concessions from the 
North.  Whether such deals are a good thing from the standpoint of trade liberalization 
depends, of course, on the nature of the harmonization. 
182. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal 
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994); Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1144 
(1994). 
183. See Kalderimis, supra note 23, at 329–31 (distinguishing between “defensive” and 
“progressive” harmonization). 
184. See Cottier, supra note 21, at 221 (“[T]rade liberalization, at some point, 
inherently starts to require, rely upon and develop positive integration, i.e., it depends on 
common and shared standards.”). 
185. See, e.g., id. at 221; Guzman, supra note 27, at 306–07. 
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unavoidable.186 
If strategic linkage of regulatory issues cannot be excluded entirely, 
could it be policed to control abuses?  Ideally, one would want to devise 
a mechanism to channel regulatory talks to the optimal level, confining 
most to single-issue forums,187 while permitting a chosen few to advance 
into multi-issue “Mega Rounds” of the sort Guzman envisions in cases 
in which distributional skews block a policy outcome that everyone 
agrees is in their long-term interest.  In this way, the best of both worlds 
could be obtained, because linkage would be restricted to issues in 
which it is needed the most. 
B.  Mutual Gain As a Substantive Criterion 
The difficulty comes in determining how such a channeling 
mechanism might function.  The most immediate focus needs to be on 
restricting the agenda of future trade rounds in the WTO, because these 
are the fora in which cross-issue logrolling can most readily occur.  The 
approach advocated by Jagdish Bhagwati would rely explicitly on the 
criterion of “mutual gain” as the prerequisite for linkage:  non-trade 
issues could only be negotiated under WTO auspices to the extent that 
they promise outcomes that would benefit all participants.188  His 
approach would, thus, bar agreements such as TRIPs that serve to bring 
in issues with built-in distributional skews. 
Ensuring mutual gain could prevent linkage from facilitating sub-
optimal outcomes.  However, it is not obvious how such a requirement 
could be enforced.  Proponents of TRIPs argued, however 
tendentiously, that IPR would benefit developing nations by spurring 
innovation and transfers of technology.  Who is to say for sure that they 
were wrong?  Mutual gain can be measured on many levels:  
micro/macro or short-term/long-term.  It might be unwise to rule out 
 
186. See Keohane & Nye, supra note 59, at 270–72 (arguing that linkage is necessary to 
address an “inherently connected” world). 
187. Such forums need not be located within the WTO, as Guzman envisions with his 
proposed departmental structure.  Regulatory issues could continue to be dealt with in such 
pre-existing international bodies as WIPO, the World Health Organization, UNESCO, 
International Labour Organization, and the various environmental fora.  Only where multi-
issue tradeoffs are required would the issue be transferred to the WTO for inclusion in a 
trade round.  Such a hybrid multi-institutional structure would have the advantage of 
preserving the institutional capital and technical expertise of existing regimes (and to some 
degree insulating them from the mercantilist pressures of the WTO), while providing the 
option of referring certain proposals to the WTO both for bargaining purposes and, where 
appropriate, for enforcement under the WTO’s dispute resolution mechanisms. 
188. Bhagwati, After Seattle, supra note 7, at 57–59. 
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potential agreements merely on the basis of distributional skews if there 
were assurances that mutual benefits would accrue in the long run.  
Indeed, even trade, Bhagwati’s paragon of mutual gain, can engender 
short-term welfare losses as shifting markets force industrial 
restructuring, as he himself acknowledges.189  Yet, while the long-term 
benefits of trade liberalization might qualify as axiomatic, the 
consequences of other regulatory policies are much harder to forecast. 
Establishing a methodology to identify the right sort of “mutual 
gain” after netting all of the losses presents a daunting challenge, and 
Bhagwati does not attempt this.  Therefore, relying on mutual gain as a 
substantive criterion to vet linkage claims appears somewhat 
impractical.  While certainly a desirable goal in principle, it offers 
limited practical utility as a screening device. 
V.  A PROCEDURAL SOLUTION:  PRE-COMMITMENT AS PREREQUISITE 
A.  Vetting by Process 
A better approach would be procedural, rather than substantive.  
The idea would be to build procedural “filters” into the agenda-setting 
mechanism of a trade round to weed out flawed or one-sided regulatory 
proposals.  Several commentators have proposed “constitutional” 
solutions along these lines, such as democratizing the WTO by opening 
it to participation by civil society, promoting transparency, and 
incorporating protections of fundamental rights.190  However, whatever 
their intrinsic merits, such proposals face an uphill battle.  Most member 
states of the WTO remain firmly wedded to its current 
intergovernmental mode of dealings and would be unwilling to 
relinquish further sovereignty to an organization they could not fully 
control.191 
Given such constraints, the best approach may be to work sub-
constitutionally within the political economy of member states alone.  
The general idea would be to let the political “marketplace” of member 
states decide which agreements offer sufficient promise of mutual 
benefit to justify linkage.  Just as the “invisible hand” of the market 
 
189. Bhagwati, Symposium, supra note 46, at 127. 
190. See, e.g., Petersmann, supra note 6, at 122–25. 
191. The enormous fuss raised over filing amicus briefs in WTO dispute resolution 
offers a glimpse of the determination of member states to defend their sovereign prerogatives 
in this regard.  See generally Georg C. Umbricht, An ‘Amicus Curiae Brief’ on Amicus Curiae 
Briefs at the WTO, 4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 773 (2001) (summarizing debate). 
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tabulates the collective preferences of private actors to generate a 
wealth-maximizing solution, the collective decisions of WTO Members 
arguably could provide a better indicator of mutual gain than any 
“command and control” regime relying on substantive criteria to guide 
its decisions.192 
The key is to get the process right.  Just as markets function best 
under rules that ensure an even playing field and equal access to 
information, the process of lawmaking must be regulated to ensure 
optimal decision-making.  Parliamentary procedures in domestic 
legislatures commonly incorporate a variety of mechanisms to slow 
down decision-making, improve deliberation, and promote internal 
transparency.  As noted earlier, international lawmaking not only lacks 
these sort of procedural safeguards but also suffers from systemic 
imperfections that raise additional dangers.193  Therefore, the obvious 
remedy is to build safeguards into the WTO process. 
Peter Drahos has written of the need to create the conditions for 
“democratic bargaining” over regulatory harmonization.194  Drahos 
focuses on the conduct of the actual negotiations.  However, equal 
attention should be paid to the process of setting the agenda.195  
Accordingly, in order to qualify for inclusion in a trade round, proposals 
for regulatory harmonization of non-trade issues should be subject to 
certain prerequisites designed to establish a shared “pre-commitment” 
among a significant subset of WTO Members.  Such pre-qualifying 
procedures would be limited to proposals presenting the greatest danger 
of regulatory abuse—namely, harmonization measures containing 
affirmative regulatory mandates covering non-trade issues.  The 
purpose of such procedures would be three-fold.  First, they would 
winnow the field of candidate issues, reducing the logistical complexities 
of negotiating across multiple issues in a round and the opportunity for 
tactical abuses thereby created.  Second, they would both encourage and 
enable a focused assessment and critique of each specific proposal, 
 
192. See Drahos, supra note 148, at 162–64 (describing democracies as producing more 
efficient regulatory outcomes than in communist societies and extending model to democratic 
bargaining among sovereign states). 
193. See supra notes 71–86 and accompanying text. 
194. See Drahos, supra note 148, at 163–64 (describing conditions for democratic 
bargaining between sovereign states); see also Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The New Intellectual 
Property Law System:  New Actors, New Institutions, New Sources, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. 
L. REV. 205 (2006). 
195. Cf. MUELLER, supra note 64, at 92–94 (describing how agenda control permits 
manipulation of ostensibly democratic outcomes). 
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providing quality control that would serve as a confidence booster 
before any horse trading could begin.196  Third, the pre-commitment 
required by this “vetting” process would help to legitimize the proposal 
should it ultimately be adopted by demonstrating initial broad 
consensual support. 
Adopting a set of procedural rules along these lines need not require 
any “constitutional” changes in the WTO.  Member states could adopt 
such rules as an operating convention akin to the internal parliamentary 
rules set by each house of Congress.197  They would be implemented as 
part of the conditions of a newly-launched trade round and could always 
be revised by consensus.198  However, if they proved successful over 
time, a legitimacy norm that might acquire de facto constitutional force 
could emerge.199 
B.  In Praise of Committees 
In domestic parliamentary contexts, there is a similar process of 
vetting functions through a variety of mechanisms.  The process begins 
when a bill is introduced.  The bill must be framed as a concrete 
legislative proposal that could be enacted in its present form and is often 
subject to scope limitations and labeling requirements.  Proposed 
legislation may then be referred to one or more committees for 
consideration and approval before being offered for a floor vote.  
Parliamentary procedures may also entail multiple “readings” of a bill 
before it can advance.  Finally, bicameralism and executive vetoes build 
additional stages of review into the legislative process.  These checks 
and balances serve to temper the pitfalls of majoritarian power by 
delaying impulse legislation, preventing legislative surprises, restricting 
logrolling, and generally encouraging an orderly process.  They also 
provide pre-defined points of entry for external stakeholders to offer 
input and attempt to influence decisions.  Perhaps just as important, 
 
196. The analogy might be to a mandatory veterinary exam before the horses are put 
up for auction. 
197. Cf. Ruud, supra note 64, at 451 (describing how the Constitution delegates to each 
chamber of Congress the task of establishing its own internal rules of procedure). 
198. Again, the analogy would be to the rules of Congress, which are left entirely to the 
discretion of its Members.  As has become recently apparent, even hallowed parliamentary 
traditions as the Senate filibuster remain open to revision upon a simple majority vote.  See 
Brian McGuire, S.D. Senator Warns Democrats Against Obstruction Tactics, N.Y. SUN, Nov. 
18, 2005, at 5. 
199. An analogy here might be drawn to British “unwritten” constitutionalism, which, 
in principle, remains subject to the paramount supremacy of Parliament, but as a practical 
matter effectively constitutes a de facto set of binding norms. 
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such requirements serve to enhance confidence in the legislative process 
as a form of deliberative democracy that produces results that can be 
accepted as legitimate.200 
A committee system offers perhaps the best opportunity for in-depth 
vetting.  Committees in U.S. legislatures comprise a subset of Members, 
reflecting bipartisan balance, who are given continuing oversight over a 
pre-defined set of issues.201  As such, they can acquire technical expertise 
in these issues over time and assemble a specialized staff.  Committees 
hold hearings to gather testimony and review evidence on issues 
relevant to proposed legislation and issue reports summarizing their 
findings.202  Their efforts help to build a consensus around legislative 
proposals.203  Finally, in order to “report out” a bill, committee members 
must vote in approval, bestowing their blessing of presumptive 
legitimacy. 
The committee review process thus serves many of the pre-
qualifying functions identified above.  It helps to winnow the field of 
proposed legislation, conserving and prioritizing legislative resources.  It 
provides quality control by ensuring that the pros and cons of a given 
bill are clearly identified and that obvious flaws have been vetted.  And 
finally, committee approval represents a degree of “pre-commitment” 
by key legislators in that it tests the political support behind the 
proposal.  Because committee procedures often enable minority 
blocking tactics,204 committee approval may also signify a measure of 
bipartisan support that confers additional legitimacy.205 
Note, however, that these pre-qualifying functions lose their 
 
200. See generally POPKIN, supra note 69, at 152–53.  Cf. Dean E. Murphy, Same Sex 
Marriage Wins Vote In California, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2005, at A14 (describing criticism of 
California Assembly legislators’ use of “gut and amend” tactics as subverting the normal 
legislative process). 
201. Committees are often further subdivided into subcommittees, thereby providing 
yet another layer of review.  For reasons of simplicity, these two levels will be collapsed into 
one in the following discussion. 
202. See generally Alan Rosenthal, The State of State Legislatures, 11 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 1185 (1983) (describing the “workhorse” role performed by committees). 
203. See Common Cause of Penn. v. Commonwealth, 668 A.2d 190 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1995) (describing consensus-building function served by committees).  A bill that has 
undergone committee review, thus, acquires a degree of inherent legitimacy that the 
measures enacted solely through majority floor votes may be perceived as lacking. 
204. Such minority blocking is colloquially referred to “bottling up in committee.” 
205. One might also regard the bicameral structure of the U.S. Congress as constituting 
a second level of “committee” review.  The Senate filibuster can also be seen as enforcing a 
heightened “pre-commitment” by requiring a supermajority of Members to allow a vote to 
proceed.  See POPKIN, supra note 69, at 154–55 (describing the operation of a filibuster). 
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meaning to the extent that subsequent amendments to the bill 
materially alter its contents.206  Accordingly, many legislatures impose 
limits on floor amendments.  For example, rules in the U.S. House of 
Representatives require amendments to be “germane.”  Many bills are 
brought up under special rules precluding amendments entirely.207 
Could a committee system be grafted onto the WTO treaty process?  
With 148 Members in the WTO, trade negotiations have grown 
increasingly unwieldy.208  The WTO already relies on “working groups” 
and “green room” processes to caucus and to negotiate on an 
exploratory basis and has various standing committees and councils 
charged with specific issues on a more permanent basis.209  Could linkage 
proposals be formally delegated to some such group?  In fact, a 
committee system did function in GATT prior to 1991 to set the 
agendas.  The Consultative Group of Eighteen (CG-18) was made up of 
key member states representing a broad spectrum of geopolitical 
interests, which by some accounts was successful in building a consensus 
around forthcoming trade initiatives.210  Proposals to reconstitute it 
occasionally surface.211  A committee approach has also been used 
successfully as a consensus-building mechanism in other international 
contexts.212 
 
206. Cf. Murphy, supra note 200. 
207. POPKIN, supra note 69, at 153–54. 
208. See Keohane & Nye, supra note 59, at 270–72. 
209. See generally WTO Charter, supra note 11, art. IV; Sylvia Ostry, World Trade 
Organization:  Institutional Design for Better Governance, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, 
LEGITIMACY:  THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM, supra note 7, 
at 361 (describing “green room” process in which informal caucusing occurs). 
210. See id. at 368–69. 
211. See id.; see also Gary Hufbauer, Part Five Summary to EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, 
LEGITIMACY:  THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM, supra note 7, 
at 419, 423–24 (calling for the formalization of the green room system). 
212. The “G-20” emerged as informal coordinating body comprised of foreign 
ministers from a select grouping of global powers during the aftermath of the emerging 
market financial crises in the late 1990s and proved a successful sounding board and 
consensus builder for international economic policy, pulling together “the right countries” in 
a careful balance between legitimacy (ensuring global representativeness) and effectiveness 
(limiting membership to a manageable size).  See Paul Martin, A Global Answer to Global 
Problems, 84 FOREIGN AFF. 2 (2005) (calling for an expansion of this committee model to 
tackle other international challenges).  Jonathan Fried has suggested that this precedent 
could serve as a model for WTO governance.  See Jonathan T. Fried, General Summary to 
EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, LEGITIMACY:  THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE 
MILLENNIUM, supra note 7, at 428; see also Hufbauer, supra note 211, at 423–24 (citing 
similar committee governance models from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
World Bank). 
PAGER - FORMATTED 3/3/2006  12:51:11 PM 
2006] TRIPS:  A LINK TOO FAR? 261 
 
However, at present, any proposal to delegate decision-making 
authority over WTO business to a limited subset of Members is 
probably politically untenable.213  The WTO membership has expanded 
from its GATT origins as a relatively homogeneous club dominated by 
Anglo-Europeans to become a much more diverse body.214  Members 
remain zealously protective of their sovereign rights and intensely 
suspicious of any hint of insider dealings from which they might be 
excluded.215  Work within the WTO’s existing committee structures as 
well as informal groupings on an ad hoc basis would be helpful in the 
preparatory stages because these structures can consider various 
regulatory options and help build a consensus around a specific 
proposal.  However, at least for the foreseeable future, formal agenda-
setting decisions would have to be undertaken at a higher level process 
in which all Members could participate fully.216 
C.  A Committee of the Whole 
If a committee system is ruled out, perhaps an equivalent vetting 
mechanism could be devised to serve as a “virtual committee.”  One 
answer would be to reconstitute the WTO membership as a “committee 
of the whole” that would perform essentially the same pre-qualifying 
functions.  To do so, three main procedural requirements would need to 
be respected.  First, a reasonably specific and concrete regulatory 
proposal needs to be placed on the table for consideration at the outset 
of a trade round in a form that could be enacted into law.  Second, 
adequate opportunity to review the proposal and to suggest changes 
 
213. As one seasoned trade diplomat observed, after Seattle, any revival of the CG-18 
is a non-starter.  See B.K. Zutshi, Comment, World Trade Organization:  Institutional Design 
for Better Governance, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, LEGITIMACY:  THE MULTILATERAL 
TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM, supra note 7, at 387, 389. 
214. See Keohane & Nye, supra note 59, at 266–67, 270. 
215. Id. at 269–70; Hormats, supra note 54, at 395. 
216. Many smaller nations in the developing world lack the resources to participate in 
the various working groups that the WTO fosters on an ongoing basis.  Therefore, the 
ultimate decision agenda setting should be reserved for either a Ministerial Conference or a 
General Council meeting.  Note that the other main procedural control devices of 
parliamentary systems also appear inapposite.  For example, multiple readings of proposed 
legislation can be significant when majority voting applies, because the minority can work to 
peel off individual votes to gain a blocking majority in a subsequent voting round.  Under the 
consensus rules of the WTO, however, multiple hearings are unlikely to arrive at a different 
conclusion.  Once a consensus exists, it means there is no active source of opposition to 
organize a blocking effort.  In addition, the strong, Member-centered ethos of the WTO 
makes executive vetoes by, for example, the Secretary-General, a non-starter.  Cf. Shaffer, 
supra note 77, at 60–61. 
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must be afforded to all Members.  Third, after reviewing (and possibly 
revising) the draft agreement, there would have to be a broadly shared 
consensus among Members that, at least as to its regulatory merits, the 
proposal makes enough sense that it deserves inclusion on the formal 
agenda of the round.217 
The “pre-commitment” represented by this decision would not bind 
any Member to approve the agreement as part of a package deal 
ultimately adopted at the conclusion of the round.  The only thing that it 
would decide is what gets put on the agenda.  At most, it would merely 
signal a consensus among Members that the proposal, in theory, 
represents a reasonably balanced, plausible regulatory policy solution to 
a recognizable global problem.218  Acceptance of the proposal would 
remain contingent on further negotiations to offset any anticipated (or 
perceived) inequalities in the economic and political burdens the 
proposal would engender.  During this process, concessions could be 
exacted across other issues areas over the course of the round.  Member 
states would explicitly retain the option to reject the proposal later if 
they felt they had not received sufficient compensation within the total 
package deal.  The winnowing and quality assurance functions of these 
procedural requirements are perhaps self-explanatory and would 
broadly parallel the workings of an actual committee.  Formally, all 
Members would be entitled and encouraged to study and comment on 
the proposal.  However, it would suffice in practice if a subset of 
Members performed these functions.  So long as the Members of any 
such an “subcommittee” had sufficient expertise, credibility, and were 
broadly representative of the relevant geopolitical interests, their 
evaluations could be relied on by other Members in making the final 
determination.219 
 
217. Pre-qualification would have to occur within a fixed time period following the 
round’s launch.  Proposals would, thus, have to be ready in a more-or-less final form at the 
outset.  Those proposals that missed the cutoff would have to await the next round or be 
negotiated as stand-alone agreements.  Because of this time pressure and because there might 
be a number of competing proposals proffered by different nations that take varying 
approaches on a given issue, the need for advance work to be delegated to a committee, as 
suggested above, would probably be unavoidable.  Here, the goal would be to arrive at a 
consensus solution that might integrate elements from several different proposals, or at least 
reduce the number of contenders. 
218. This would not necessarily mean that all countries would consider the issue at 
hand to be a “problem” from their individual standpoint, only that they recognize that a 
substantial subset of Members do in good faith consider the matter as such for reasons 
beyond pure mercantile advantage, and that the proposed solution constitutes a legitimate 
component of cooperative global governance. 
219. Such a “subcommittee” would likely constitute itself on an informal, de facto basis 
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A decision to “pre-commit” following such vetting would serve as a 
proxy for mutual benefit.  By committing to a specific regulatory 
proposal, WTO Members would bestow a presumptive legitimacy upon 
it.  Individual member states could always oppose the proposal later on 
trade-related or fiscal grounds.  However, it would be hard to denounce 
the entire project as fundamentally iniquitous or coercive in the way 
that TRIPs has come to be seen by some. 
A key issue to resolve would be the precise requirements of the 
“pre-commitment” process.  The usual WTO practice is to operate by 
consensus, which generally means an absence of active opposition.220  In 
theory, any Member can block any decision.  Arguably, however, 
requiring a complete consensus in this conventional WTO sense would 
be counterproductive in that it would set the bar too high.  Just as only 
four votes are required to grant a petition of certiorari in the Supreme 
Court, versus five to decide a case, there is a functional logic in keeping 
threshold requirements of admissibility lower than those demanded for 
ultimate decision-making authority.221  Demanding virtual unanimity 
might encourage holdouts or lead to logrolling or deliberate recourse to 
ambiguity that could effectively strip such a collective endorsement of 
its meaning.  This combination of logrolling and vagueness is precisely 
the problem with the WTO’s current agenda-setting process.  Formally, 
all agenda items are adopted by consensus.  However, because any 
Member can block the entire agenda if its desired issue is excluded 
entirely, agenda decisions are generally reached in a package deal.  Such 
logrolling blends the good with the bad in a bland stew of non-
committal generalities.  Encouraging such practices would undermine 
the impetus to vet regulatory proposals on an individual basis. 
Instead, WTO Members might consider relying on some form of 
voting to gauge support for regulatory proposals.  To maximize the 
legitimizing function of this process, a supermajority of Members should 
be required to pass approval.  The precise composition of this 
supermajority would need to be carefully calibrated and perhaps require 
some experimentation to obtain the optimal dynamics.  It could be 
defined through a combination of factors, subject to individual minima 
 
within the committee as a whole based on Member interest.  To be legitimate, however, any 
Member that desired would be entitled to participate, and all Members would remain 
apprised of discussions. 
220. See WTO Charter, supra note 11, art. IX(1) n.1. 
221. Lower threshold requirements encourage skeptics to keep an open mind and open 
the door to negotiation across different viewpoints. 
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and/or a weighted aggregate score.222  Factors considered could include 
the number of nations in support of the proposal, the share of world 
population they represent, their share of global trade,223 and—most 
crucially—a requirement of geopolitical diversity.  The latter condition 
would force proposed agreements to be crafted in as balanced a fashion 
as possible to appeal to diverse constituencies.  Geopolitical fault lines 
in the WTO vary by issue.  They are often hemispheric in nature, but 
not reliably so.  Perhaps the simplest approximation of diversity would 
therefore be to measure support on a continental basis.224  A significant 
degree of endorsement by each continent would be a strong indicator of 
mutual benefit. 
Abandoning the WTO’s normal consensus procedures would 
admittedly be controversial.225  Member states would be reluctant to 
surrender their blocking power, although a possible compromise would 
be to permit countries that vote against the proposal to opt-out of the 
regulatory scheme if it is ultimately approved.226  Nonetheless, pre-
 
222. Cf. Van den Bossche & Alexovicova, supra note 36, at 675.  A model for this kind 
of composite weighting of voting factors can be found in the European Community’s 
procedures for qualified majority voting under the Nice Treaty.  The Nice Treaty requires the 
support of two-thirds of European Community Members, which represent two-thirds of the 
total E.U. population.  Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 205, Nov. 10, 1997, 
1997 O.J. (C 340) 3; see also Martin, supra note 212, at 3 (describing economic and 
demographic criteria that makes G-20 a representative body of world opinion). 
223. Cf. Van den Bossche & Alexovicova, supra note 36, at 675–676.  Such use of 
functional criteria has a precedent in the Kyoto Agreement on Global Warming, which 
required a minimum number of national signatories that collectively accounted for a pre-
defined share of the total global emissions.  Another example would be IMF voting, which is 
weighted based on invested shares.  See id. at 676. 
224. Using continental divisions as a proxy for geopolitical representation has a long 
pedigree in international law.  The traditional rotation of the Secretary-Generalship of the 
United Nations is perhaps the best example.  NATO similarly splits its top jobs on a 
continental basis between an American and an European. 
225. Some would argue voting by supermajority would require amendment of the 
WTO Charter.  At present, Article IX of the WTO Charter governing “Decision-Making”  
permits both consensual decisions and majority voting, although in practice the latter is rarely 
done.  Members could always agree in advance to be bound by the supermajority procedure 
outlined here for purposes of regulatory agenda setting, with the resultant decisions to be 
implemented by consensus or, if necessary, forced through by a majority vote.  See WTO 
Charter, supra note 11, art. IX; Van den Bossche & Alexovicova, supra note 36, at 676. 
226. Such an opt-out provision would address the objection based on national 
sovereignty that countries should never be bound by agreements to which they did not 
consent (even though the issue here is only one of agenda setting).  A similar opt-out is 
contemplated under Article X procedures on amendment.  See WTO Charter, supra note 11, 
art. X(3).  Permitting Members to opt-out of regulatory agreements would leave the 
remainder to proceed on a plurilateral basis.  It might also be worth considering a further 
amendment of the WTO Charter to eliminate the current requirement of a complete 
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qualifying regulatory proposals by supermajority vote could prove a real 
improvement over the WTO’s current mode of business. 
Another problem with current practice is that the resultant agendas 
are far too malleable.  The vague language in which they are drafted 
provides ample room for reinterpretation and imposes little constraint 
on the actual content of negotiations.  Moreover, issue agendas can and 
do evolve as trade rounds progress.  The Uruguay Round was 
particularly notorious for this reason.  The very idea of the WTO was 
only proposed midway through the Round.  Such agenda changes 
require consensus, but so does successful resolution of the round.  The 
agenda is but a starting point for the bargaining that follows 
As a result, negotiations throughout a trade round follow a series of 
moving targets.  Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.  
Competing drafts may be circulated in multiple variations.  Member 
states are free to play bait and switch, inflating their demands as 
opportunities for leverage present themselves in the free-for-all of 
simultaneous negotiations.  Compromises are brokered through various 
insider deals reached in ad hoc meetings.227  Meanwhile, powerful actors 
can manipulate the agenda to build a consensus around provisions they 
favor, while marginalizing proposals from rivals.228  Consequently, it 
becomes hard for individual Members (not to mention interested 
observers) to keep track of negotiations and to participate meaningfully 
in shaping specific regulatory provisions.  Moreover, as the prospect of a 
package deal beckons, the temptation to lose track of complexities and 
elide outstanding sticking points grows. 
Again, such free-wheeling horse trades present less of a problem so 
long as the net result is liberalization.  However, with regulatory 
harmonization on the table, such welfare-maximizing outcomes are no 
longer ensured.  The pre-qualifying procedures proposed here address 
the special concerns raised by regulatory linkage by ensuring that a 
specific, concrete proposal has been tabled and vetted for regulatory 
balance prior to the start of the round. 
Having a concrete proposal on the table would help to focus the 
debate and permit subsequent bargaining to proceed from a known 
starting point.  The tradeoff would be that once a proposal is pre-
 
consensus to bring new plurilateral agreements into the WTO framework.  See WTO Charter, 
supra note 11, art. X(9). 
227. BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, BUSINESS REGULATION, supra note 3, at 83–84; 
Drahos, supra note 148, at 167–69. 
228. Cf. Helfer, supra note 133, at 21; Drahos, supra note 148, at 169. 
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qualified, subsequent amendments would have to be strictly limited.  
The initial proposal would define the regulatory scope that had been 
“put in play,” and any amendments would have to be germane to the 
issues encompassed.  Only incremental adjustments would be 
countenanced, as opposed to wholesale revisions.  Furthermore, there 
would have to be an explicit consensus backing the amendment, which 
would then supersede the original proposal as the focus of discussion. 
In short, these procedures would introduce a measure of discipline 
to WTO regulatory policymaking that would be analogous to the 
parliamentary rules that govern legislative processes at the national 
level.  In both cases, the relevant norms would have to be policed by 
consensus.  While controversies might remain over boundary issues, 
merely defining outer limits would be an improvement over current 
practice. 
D.  TRIPs Revisited 
How might TRIPs have come out had pre-qualifying procedures 
been in place during the Uruguay Round?  To engage such a 
counterfactual invites speculation and risks the bias of hindsight.  One 
suspects, however, that the United States would have tendered a much 
more modest proposal that was focused on achieving the original anti-
copying agenda set out at the start of the Round. 
Such an agenda would likely have focused on literal copying and 
emphasized copyright and trademark law rather than patents (or at least 
have exempted least developed nations from its patent mandates).  
Greater attention would have been placed on preventing global 
shipments of counterfeited goods, while providing more leeway for 
member states to vary protection levels domestically.  In order to secure 
a pre-commitment from developing nations, the agreement would have 
had to have been more balanced in its content than TRIPs.  This might 
have entailed broader categories of permissible exemptions, more 
concrete user rights, and more explicit recognition of public domains.229  
Firmer commitments could have been extracted to supply technical 
assistance and shift enforcement costs onto rich countries and/or 
multinational firms.230  Perhaps other creative concessions could have 
been devised, such as differential fee schedules on patent and trademark 
applications that could offer Southern innovators greater access to IP 
 
229. See Dreyfuss, TRIPS—Round II, supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
230. See Reichman, supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
PAGER - FORMATTED 3/3/2006  12:51:11 PM 
2006] TRIPS:  A LINK TOO FAR? 267 
 
protection in Northern markets.231 
It is worth noting, however, that to pre-qualify, such an “alternative 
TRIPs” need not have been entirely devoid of distributional skews, at 
least in regard to short-term outcomes.  In contrast to WIPO, in which 
IPR treaties had been blocked, there was ample reason for developing 
countries to agree to negotiate some form of IP harmonization in 
GATT, even if the burdens were unequal, to eliminate trade frictions 
over IP issues and to entice the United States to fully commit to the 
Uruguay Round with its promise of agricultural and textile concessions 
to come.  In this sense, an implicit expectation of linkage would still 
have played into their decisions.  However, this calculus would 
necessarily have remained at least partly speculative. 
To be sure, there is a risk that pre-qualification would merely have 
frontloaded the logrolling process.  The United States might well have 
whispered certain promises in the ears of influential Members of the 
developing world bloc.  Even in domestic contexts, such informal 
logrolls cannot be prevented, only discouraged.  However, given 
logistical constraints and time pressures (and assuming prospective 
logrollers are unwilling to openly violate the rules), such understandings 
would have to remain private and, thus, contingent on further 
negotiations among other interested parties.  Pre-qualification would 
only be the start of the process.  The only matter actually to be decided 
at that stage would be whether this specific regulatory proposal would 
be formally placed on the agenda.232  Negotiations on all other non-
regulatory issues (and ultimate approval of the regulatory agreement(s) 
themselves) would have to await the as-yet uncertain dynamics of the 
trade round to come.233 
At minimum, pre-qualification procedures would, thus, significantly 
raise the transaction costs of logrolling ex ante versus ex post.  Some 
 
231. See Mangeni, supra note 30, at 224. 
232. Other regulatory proposals would also be subject to ex ante voting.  Because these 
proposals would come into play at roughly the same time, agenda-setting logrolls between 
them would be inevitable.  However, most regulatory deals would have a North-South 
dimension requiring non-regulatory offsets in the form of trade concessions.  Accordingly, 
such purely cross-regulatory logrolls would remain of limited value. 
233. In this respect, the temptation to engage in ex ante logrolls in agenda votes would 
be less powerful than in domestic contexts in which single-issue, majority voting applies.  
Under those conditions, blocking leverage may decline once a bill gains momentum.  
Moreover, because tradeoffs cannot be enforced in package deals, legislators need to exact 
concrete commitments in advance of their approval.  By contrast, under the WTO’s 
consensus rules, member states can always play holdout at any stage thereby reducing the 
need to settle up front. 
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nations might prefer to wait and see before committing themselves.  
Moreover, to the extent that ex ante logrolls do occur, the ability of 
smaller, less powerful nations to block a specific regulatory proposal 
from advancing without jeopardizing the entire round would 
redistribute the bargaining leverage in such deals.  One might, thus, 
expect ex ante logrolls to occur on a more equitable basis. 
Furthermore, by separating the pre-qualification decision from the 
ultimate decision to approve TRIPs as part of a subsequent package 
deal, developing nations would have had every incentive to negotiate 
the fairest possible agreement on IP and would have enjoyed maximum 
leverage to do so.  Decoupling the fiscal implications from the 
regulatory merits would arguably permit a broader assessment of long-
term welfare, free from mercantilist bias.  Potential stakeholders would 
have the opportunity to weigh in on the debate and have their interests 
taken into account before such calculations became subsumed in the 
machinations of the larger trade round, thereby helping to reduce the 
risk of capture by special interests.  Such ex ante approval would also 
have gone some ways to blunt post hoc claims of coercion.234  Moreover, 
because the pre-qualified draft would be regarded as close to the final 
version, more careful attention could have been paid to drafting issues 
than is possible during the fluid negotiations of a typical trade round.  
Indeed, some of this work could have been delegated elsewhere, well in 
advance of the round, for example, drawing on the technical expertise of 
WIPO.235  Everyone would know exactly what they were getting going 
in.  As a result, no one could claim later “we wuz robbed.” 
E.  Escaping the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
The real value of the procedural reforms proposed here must be 
proven in the post-TRIPs world.  Their benefits might be as much 
systemic as specific.  Trade negotiations, like markets, function better 
 
234. Some coercion claims lodged by TRIPs critics relate to pressure tactics exerted 
outside the GATT process, such as U.S. threats of unilateral trade sanctions under section 
301, discriminatory use of trade preferences, or indirect pressure through the IMF and World 
Bank.  See RICHARDS, supra note 79, at 125–31; Drahos, supra note 148, at 169–70.  The 
inclusion of binding dispute resolution as part of the WTO package has partially defanged 
such coercive instruments.  However, the realities of geopolitical power are such that external 
coercion can never be eliminated entirely. 
235. See Abbott, Distributed Governance, supra note 27, at 21–23 (discussing 
distributed governance scheme between WIPO and TRIPs); Reichman, supra note 48, at 465 
(discussing the same).  In this scenario, WIPO would function as something akin to an 
external committee, much like the law commissions found in other common law systems and 
in some states in the United States. 
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when subject to rules.  The GATT’s free-wheeling, unstructured 
approach appears increasingly inadequate in light of current trade 
politics.  As trade negotiations continue to grow more complex, with 
more Members, more diverse interests, and ever more issues to reckon 
with, trade rounds have become protracted ordeals with a centripetal 
nature that threatens to spin out of control.  The proliferation of linkage 
claims poses a particular danger.  TRIPs set a powerful precedent that 
continues to resonate.  Already, a long-line of “me too” issues is jostling 
for inclusion. 
Some degree of linkage is arguably essential for the WTO to 
advance its liberalizing agenda.  Yet, the politics of trade linkages are 
torn by a mismatch of North-South agendas.  Northern governments are 
bombarded by interest group pressures to push linkages at every turn.  
Southern negotiators, backed by their own NGO allies, have recoiled, 
blocking linkage attempts during in the current Doha Round even on 
issues that could benefit them—and at the cost of scuttling progress on 
things they do want, such as liberalization of agriculture.236  Having felt 
burnt by TRIPs, developing nations seem to view any linkage 
proposal—however innocuous—as a potential Trojan horse that could 
usher in a regulatory fait accompli that they would be powerless to 
oppose later. 
As the Doha Round grinds to a halt, the WTO cannot afford to 
continue on a path of benign neglect.  Already, the recent proliferation 
of bilateral and regional trade agreements demonstrates a lack of 
confidence in the multilateral system and has arguably undermined the 
commitment to Doha.237  Even flawed agreements in the WTO might be 
preferable to this patchwork of overlapping regulatory regimes.  Yet, 
the current atmosphere of distrust in the WTO stands in the way.  
Linkage is not the only source of this distrust, but it is part of the 
problem.  The laissez faire conditions under which trade talks operate 
offer member states too much room to maneuver and to act 
opportunistically.  Yet, no one comes out ahead if everyone plays the 
same hand.  In short, the WTO may be victim to a form of “prisoner’s 
dilemma.”  The only way to win in the long run is to cooperate.  This 
requires putting in place procedural rules to which everyone is 
committed so that trade talks can proceed under an atmosphere of trust. 
Pre-qualification procedures for non-trade regulatory proposals 
 
236. See WTO Under Fire, supra note 51, at 26–28. 
237. The World Trade Organization:  10-Year Review:  A World Trading System in 
Peril?, INT’L REV. (N.Y. Law Sch., Ctr. for Int’l Law, New York, N.Y.), Spring 2005, at 12. 
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would be a good place to start.  Such procedures would give developing 
nations additional maneuvering space and leverage to block linkage 
strategies on a more selective basis, without holding up the entire round.  
This would help thin the queue of aspiring candidates for regulatory 
expansion of the WTO.  Future proposals would have to be more 
modest in scope, perhaps introduced piecemeal in incremental steps.  
Yet, as a confidence-building measure, this might not be a bad thing and 
would help to defuse the stalemate that has paralyzed the past two 
ministerial meetings at Cancún and Doha.  The problem in the WTO 
right now might be too little linkage as well as too much.  Paradoxically, 
imposing procedural discipline on linkage proposals might solve both 
problems. 
However reasonable these procedural requirements may sound in 
theory, one must also consider whether they are politically viable.  
Agreeing to these procedural restraints would mean forfeiting the 
ability to unilaterally veto trade agendas and limit the freedom of 
Members to engage in opportunistic maneuvering.  Traditionally, 
powerful nations such as the United States have exploited such freedom 
to manipulate agendas and to manufacture a consensus around their 
own self-serving aims.238  Yet, other nations are learning to play the 
game too.  The developing world has proven much more effective at 
hanging together during the Doha Round than it did during Uruguay, as 
the rollback on pharmaceutical patents attests.239 
As trade negotiations continue to get more complex, the ability of 
any one Member to dominate the proceedings has diminished.  
Meanwhile, linkage tactics threaten a continued stalemate that is in no 
one’s interest.  The rules of GATT have grown outdated.  They permit 
too much license for individual nations to pursue private advantage at a 
collective and cumulative cost.  By undertaking procedural reforms, the 
WTO would free itself from this destructive anarchy of opportunism 
and reinvigorate the agenda of global integration. 
Even if the specific proposal advanced here is not adopted or 
appears inadequate, it is still worth considering these larger procedural 
concerns.  As the globalization of law shifts more and more regulatory 
powers to international institutions, attention to the procedural aspects 
of global governance has become a matter of growing importance.  This 
 
238. See Helfer, supra note 133, at 21. 
239. See WTO Under Fire, supra note 50, at 26 (describing emergence of G-22 bloc of 
developing nations at Cancún that presented a common front across issues); Abbott, 
Medicines Decision, supra note 161, at 343–44 (same). 
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Article engages a small part of a much broader challenge:  thinking 
about how to craft regulatory responses to global problems in a way that 
can be accepted as both legitimate and efficient.  The political science 
and economy of international lawmaking remains relatively under-
theorized.  Much can be gained merely by translating insights about 
domestic lawmaking to the international context and incorporating 
analogous procedures.  Yet, as this Article has highlighted, the 
international system presents its own unique set of challenges, even 
setting aside the considerable diversity encompassed within that term.  
How best to meet these challenges remains open to debate. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that the use of linkage strategies to advance 
regulatory goals in WTO trade rounds represents a double-edged sword.  
While enabling cross-issue compensation to neutralize distributional 
skews, the practice carries a risk of unintended repercussions.  The 
TRIPs Agreement demonstrates at least prima facie evidence of adverse 
effects both specific and systemic.  Uninhibited use of linkage strategies 
also invites opportunistic gamesmanship that could have cumulative 
impact resulting in paralysis.  Accordingly, pre-qualifying procedures to 
control the use of linkage should be instituted.  By ensuring the pre-
commitment of a geographically balanced supermajority, such 
procedures would serve to enhance both the rationality and legitimacy 
of the agreements that ultimately result. 
Such reforms would not be a panacea.  The challenges of 
multinational trade negotiations remain numerous and daunting.  
Procedural rules can always be circumvented when powerful actors are 
determined to evade them.  Linkages would remain problematic even if 
these procedures were adhered to, as would regulatory harmonization 
even in the absence of linkage.  And regulatory linkage is far from the 
only contentious item on the WTO’s plate.  Nonetheless, the experience 
of domestic lawmaking suggests that procedures can make a difference, 
even if imperfect or largely symbolic.  The WTO would do well to learn 
from this example. 
 
